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PREFACE 
The influences of food plants and plant diseases on hu.::nan affairs, a 1 tho11gh 
often underemphasIzed, have not been totally overlooked bj historians. W. H. 
McNeill, author of Th~ Risa of the ~, wrote his doctoral dissertation on the 
influence of the potato on Irish history. waile McNeill's study was quite wid a in 
scope, Cecil Hoodham-Smith's The Great Hunger, concentrated on the effects of the 
potato blight, caused by the fungus, Phytophthora infestans. Thus historians 
have publicized the far-reaching effects of this tragic example of the interaction 
of man with plants and plant diseases. But other significant casas are perhaps 
less well-known. For instance, it was coffee rust which caused the total collapse 
of the coffee industry in Ceylon and the East Indies in the 1880's and 1890's. 
This had enormous consequences for the producing countries themselves and for 
millions of people els~where. Ceylon changed from the world's leading coffee pro-
ducer to an important tea-producer, while the coffee plante~s in the East Indies 
only reluctantly switched to that extremely lucrative substitute crop, rub~er. 
In the British Isles, the failure of the British coffee industry in Ceylon becaus~ 
of coffee rust, was directly responsible for the decline of coffee drinking, and 
the subsequent rise in the consumption of tea to what became one of the highest 
per capita rates in the world. Other examples could be mentioned, such ag the 
disastrous effects of plant diseases and pests on viticulture in France during 
the 19th century. But without going further, it can be seen that the importance 
of plant diseases in history is too great to be ignored. 
Although caused by the fungus, Phytophthora, the same genus responsible for 
the Irish Potato Blight, the e ffec ts of the taro blight on Bouga inv i lle and sur-
rounding isL.lUds were not as far-reaching as the events of the above cxa~ples. 
iv 
This study will shmv, hcwever, that t:::'e blight's (.!rrects were si:;nificantly 
important to the indigenous people of these islands. 
The islands of Bougainville and Buka, sepa.rated only by a shallow ha1£-
mile THide strait, are situated approximately 500 miles directly east of the 
New Guinea mainland. Geologically they comprise the northern-most islands of 
the Solomon Island chain and lie parallel to its nortilwest-solltheast axis be-
t,\.,reen 5" and r' south latitude. The larger is land still carries the name of the 
French explorer, Louis de Bougainville, who was ehe first European to record 
its existence. Although Buka had been sight2d by Philip Carteret, the previous 
year, Bougainville and the members of his expedition sighted and named both is-
lands in 1768. In 1899 the two islands and their Melanesian inhabitants came 
under German sovereignty and so remained until the Australians seized them in 
1914. Between the first and second world wars, the islands were governed by 
Australia under a League of Nations Mandate. During World War II, the 
Australians set up, as a branch of the Australian Army, the Australian New 
Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU), which administered Bougainville and Buka 
until the postwar Provisional Administration took over in May 1946. In Decem-
ber 1946, the old Mandated Territory became a United Nations Trust Territory~ 
The Provisional ~~ministration ended in 1949 when the Papua New Guinea Act 
officially established the postwar administration. 
Readers of this study should be aware that there is some controversy among 
agricultural scientists as to the significance of the disease, Phytophthora. i 
colocasiae, on Bougainville-Buka and in the British Solomons. Plant patholo-
gists have pointed out that the pathogen, f. colocasiae, was not properly 
identified (using a mi.croscope) until the 1950's. Since the occurrence of a 
.. 
v 
serious viral disease of taro has come to light in the British Solomons 
(D. E. GoUifer, personal COllllnu;tications), there has been some speculation that 
virus diseases rather than 1 lytophthor~ were responsible for the decline of taro 
on Bougainville and neighbor~.g islands. Because of this speculation and the 
lack of research by scientists into the history of R. colocasiae and its signif-
icance in these islands, I have given more detailed accounts of the recorded 
descriptions .;)f the disease ani the subsequent a.ttempts to identify it than w.;)Uld 
otherwise be required. To other than agricultural specialists, these detailed 
accounts may appear unnecessary and redundant, but they are included to help 
more clearly doctmlent the tru," nature of the blight-causing pathogen. 
The source materials for the government response, and to a certain extent 
for indigenous response, were found mainly in government archives, although 
other written sources were also utiliz€~. In addition, the people of 
Bougainville~Buka were consulted through the use of oral history interviews. I 
spent 10;'2 weeks (mid-October through December 1973) on Bc.ugainville and Buka 
visiting villages and conducting interviews. These interviews are described in 
Appendix A. 
*"}~i(** 
This study could not have been completed without the cooperation of many 
individua Is ::md institutions. I am especially indebted to Professor Douglas L. 
Oliver and his student, Robert Kirk Shoffner, for both enc0uraging me to under-
take this study and aSSisting me in its completion. A former student of Pro"essor 
Oliver's, Dr. Eugene Ogan, provided invaluable aid. 
In Papua New Guinea my work was immensely facilitated by the full cooper~tion 
of Dr. Dorothy Shaw and numerous other members of the Department of Agriculture, 
Stock, anJ Fisheries. Professor Donald Denoon, Dr. Peter Bolger, and many others 
" 
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at the University of Papua New Guinea provided crucial support. On 60ugainville 
I received material help from many residents, both European and Indigenous, but 
I am especially grateful to Mr. Taco DeVries, then with the DASF, for his gen-
erous hospitality and assistance. 
Here at the University of Hawaii I wish to express my sincere graditude 
fOL the assistance given by Professors A. Ga-van DarNS and Er1.' . ..rard D. Beechert of 
the History Department, Professor Ronald C. Taylor of the Meteorology Department, 
and Professor EduaLdo E. Trujillo of the Plant Pathology Department. Finally I 
am grateful to the Food Institute of the East-West Center for financing my re-
search and to my wife, Carole, for her long hours of devoted work, especially 
in the often hot and justy surroundings of government archives. 
Jerry C. Packard 
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Goverrunent Response to the Blight 
The earliest known written report concerning the taro bliGht on 
Bougainville comes from the files of the Australian New Guinea Adminis-
trative Unit (m~GAU). In early 1945, ft~GAU patrol officers began to 
report a blight or "die back" of taro in the Kunua area of Bougain-
ville. l (See map in Figure 1) Hhen the ANGAU Regional Headquar-:ers at 
Lae was notified, the officer in charge suggested that Capt. B. A. 
O'Connor, ANGAU Entomologist, visit Bougainville to investigate these 
reports. Capt. O'Connor also acted as a plant pathologist since ft~GAU 
had no one else better qualified. In a July 31, 1945 report Capt. 
O'Connor described what he had found: 
On July 18 I proceeded to Sipai, and investigated a disease 
of taro in the surrounding district. This disease is Ylide-
spread and causes almost total destruction of the crop. In 
the early stages of the disease, a darkened, watery spot 
appears on the leaf, which increases in size, the lesions 
showing concentric rings. Large droplets of pale fluid 
appear on the damaged tissue, later becoming deep red in 
colour. The leaf tissue rots away, and falls out from be-
tween the main veins leaving the leaf very ragged. The in-
fection then spreads to the petiole, and the plant collapses 
and dies. Examination of the corm shows it to 'oe rotten. 
The causative factor is a fungus, Phytophthora coZocasiae. 
It is worthy of note that the natives state that this 
disease has not been known to them before. 2 
Capt. O'Connor's identification of the disease as Phytophthora 
aoZoaasiae was made from field observations without the aid of a micro-
scope. He did, however, have a text on tropical plant diseases by the 
British mycologist, E. J. Butler, which contains a ver-J complete des-
cription &~d illustration of the disease, Phytophthora colocasiae. 3 
As will be show~ later, Capt. O'Connor's identification was quite 
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Fig. 1 BOUGAINVILLE-BUKA: SUBDISTRICTS AND CENSUS DIVISIONS 
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accurate, his description being an exact account of the disease's 
symptoms. 
By October of 1945, the ANGAU District Headquarters on Bougainville 
noted that, "Regarding the taro disease, reports are now filtering in 
to the effect that it has caused widespread failure throughout this 
t 
District."'-+ Thus it was ~.NGAU ,,Thich provided the fir,t known written 
record of the taro blight on Bougainville. The blight was to be a last-
ing problem, for references to its criects occur consistently in the 
patrol reports of the 1946-1949 Provisional Administration and continue 
right up into the 1960's in the TPNG Patrol Reports. 
Reports from the British Solomons are important to the history of 
the taro blight because of the close proximity of the3e islands to 
Bougainville and the interacti'~,'.l between the two territories concerning 
the blight. The earliest known written record of taro blight in the 
British Solomons was from December of 1946. In a memorandum dated 
Dec. 19, 1946~ the Senior Agricultural Officer, D. J. Badcock, after a 
visit to the Short land Islands, reported "a disease of taro which has 
resulted in the total failure of the crop.,,7 Badcock later mentioned 
that the disease was noticed in the Short lands about June or July of 
1946 but that reportedly it was first observed in Bougainville early in 
the year with lOa p.::rcent infection of taro plants. 8 Although Badcock 
initially guesf:ed that a virus disease was responsible, he later ad-
mitted that it was "certainly neither a crinkle or mosdic type of virus." 
He had suspected a virus because of the virulence of the disease. His 
.. 
I· ,~ 
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4 
observatior:s were limited. to one day only, 30 l:is de~;cription was rather 
sketchy at best: 
The observed symptoms i~dicate that the first sign of in-
fection is the entire pla.'1t droopir-g,. at thi:3 stage a small 
brown streak appears down the centre of the stem. extendinc 
to the root, the infection then appears to spread outwards 
UJltil all the growing parts above grcunc. rot away. The 
roots examir:ed by me did not display a~y oevious sigr:s of 
infection ,9 
Badcock's first rp.sponse -was to .. -rite to t:t:.e Dis"trict Commissioner 
for the Western Solomons reco!!lr.1e!".ding -cha-:' all taro on the Short land 
Islands be immediately destroyed, and no new plantings be made for a 
period of six months so that the disease might be effectively eradicated. 
He also sugg'!sted that the !' export of any :;;oot crop or soil from the 
'0 Short land area should if possible be prevented.".... Badcock further 
proposed that the cooperation of the Bougainville Administration should 
be sought to give the plan a better chance of success, The District 
Commissioner concurred with Badcock's scheme and suggested that an 
Agricultural Officer be sent to theShortl~~ds and then on to Bcugain-
ville to see the District Officer in the Buin area. The only stipUlation 
offered by J. A. Allan, the District Commissioner, was that with regard 
to taro quarantine and destruction, he preferred to "approach the matter 
by giving administrative advice, not instructions."ll Badcock found this 
stipulation to be a little naive: 
I note that it is proposed to implement the above requirements 
by administrative advice. I would suggest that this is a most 
unusual method of dealing with such a problem. I c~~ see no 
reason for beli eYing that a primi t i ve and ibnoran t people will 
be more amenable to di:-;cipl-in(' thnn relui.,i vely advallced Euro-
pean communi t,i ('s, in ·,.;hich the legal restriction of pl:wt 
movement is invariably applied in such cascs. 12 
5 
In March of 1947, the Senior Agriculturalist, John Suckling, was 
sent on a tour of the Short lands and Bougainville to organize the taro 
destruction c~paign and to gather more information on the taro disease. 
In a report on this tour he stated that the taro destruction program 
was progressing satisfactorily at the time he left. Concerning the 
disease situation he learned that taro had been the main food crop before 
. the war in the Shortlands. Towards the end of the war the Japanese had 
begun planting large gardens using planting material from elsewhere. 
Suckling assumed that some of the planting material had come from 
Bougainville. The Shortlands people began replanting their own gardens 
in about October of 1945, using material from the Japanese gardens and 
probably some from Bougainville. Suckling learned that "little or no 
taro since then has reached maturity." He has told that about six 
months after planting, a "wilt disease" occurs which "almost completely 
defoliates the Plant.,,13 Suckling added the following to Badcock's 
earlier description of the disease: 
.•.• following drooping of the plant, and when the streak appears 
down the patiole, a prplish-grey spot appears at the point of 
attachoent of the blade. This extends to the extremities of 
the leaf until the whole is a brown-grey rotting mass. The 
corms, apart from being underdeveloped present no appearance 
of disease at this stage but quickly rot after destruction of 
the aerial parts. 14 
Suckling could still not identify the causative agent but concluded 
that the disease was spread mainly through infected planting material. 
,\ 
He gathered specimens which he sent to Suva for study and identification. 
On Bougainville he learned that the taro had "been affected for some 
years by a similar organism and there is, at present, very little of 
this crop grown in the Mandated Territory.,,15 He reported that the 
6 
Bougainville aut:lOrities believed t;l:.at the diseasE. had been i:rt-roduced 
by the Japanese, because its appearance '"..805 unrecorded until their 
arrival on the island. It is interesting that Suckling did not learn 
the identity of the disease from the "new Ag!'icultural Officer!! he met 
on Bougainv~_lle. 1+ This officer merely told him that he was awaiting a 
"qualified ::nember" from the Agriculture Department, ·..rho ';lould lIa-:te~pt 
some control of the disease. ,,16 Appa2'er..tly in ~!aI'ch of 1947, the 
identity of the disease was s.till unknown to the Bcugainville a'.lthori-
ties despite Capt. 0' Connor I s correct identification almost two years 
1 • ear ...... ~er. 
The District Commissioner for the Western District, J. H. Allan, 
had accompanied Suckling on his tour of the Shortl~~ds and on his five-
day visit to Bougainville. J.\lla.~ was normally .stationed in the New 
Georgia group which is the adlninistrati ve center for the i-lestern District 
(including the Shortlands and Choiseul). Upon reading Suckling's report 
of the tour, Allan responded with a letter to the Senior Agricultural 
Officer, listing several areas of disagreement with the findings of the 
re~ort. 
I gained the impression from residents and officials of 
Bougainville who were living there immediately prior to 
the Japanese war that this disease was extant in the island 
at that time and that by December 1941 it had penetrated as 
far east as Empress Augusta Bay. Information gathered from 
Bishop Wade, Father Beck and Shortlands headmen led one to 
believe that possibly this taro disease was nothing very new 
and that it had flared up many ti.!:les in the past, and would, 
possibly, despite the destruction of present plants and the 
introduction of new plants, flare up again. 17 
*The officer must have been Gordan Wilson. See page 14. 
... 
.' 
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Suckling, in his report 0::.' the tour to the Shortlands had expressed 
the idea thet the taro destruction campaign in the Shortlands would soon 
result in "a reasonably thorough elimination of the plant," and "the 
futility of maintaining further plantings just now seems to be recog-
nized by the natives."IB According to Allan, Suckling's optimistic 
assessment proved to be a little premature. In the letter (quoted above) 
criticizing Suckling's findings, Allan described how the situation 
developed: 
On my return to Short lands after ~~ visit with Mr. Suckling, 
the Short lands chiefs and headmen together with Father Beck 
expressed most bitterly their resentment against the wholesale 
destruction of taro plants both good and bad. They complained 
that the disease was gradually working itself out and '"hat was 
more important to them, they had lost certain rare taro var-
ieties which had been brought to Short lands years ago and which 
could not be replaced. The annoyance was so great that a large 
number of the people were frankly talking of migrating from the 
Protectorate into the Mandated Territory.19 
Allan claimed to have done his best to explain to the Short lands 
people why their taro had to be destroyed but reluctantly concluded that 
they found "the basic principles of modern plant husbandry a li ttle 
difficult to understand.,,20 The indigenous Agricultural Instructors who 
actually undertook the eradication project must have suffered much abuse 
from the indignant Shortlands people. A Shortland (Faisi) Islander who 
is now a policeman in Honiara recalled how unpopular these Agricultural 
Instructors were. He said that they were literally chased about the ., 
21 island and away from endangered taro plots. Suckling, in a response 
to Allan's report, commented, "That so much indignation had been ex-
pressed serves to indicate the thoroughness with which the Agricultural 
Instructors have carried out their assignment.,,22 However, he was again 
8 
proven overly optimistic, Revi3i tin!?: the Shortlanas on ,june 2'3~r 1947 
with the Director of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea (TPNG) Denartment 
of Agriculture, Stock, and Fisheries (DAS?), W. Cottrell-Dormer,. 
Suckling discovered gardens not only containing tar.:> but containing 
diseased 
It was also during this visit with CCjttrell-Dorner that Suckling 
first learned that the te.ro disease had been i::ientii'ied as Phytoph-t.hora 
coZocasiae bJ' the DASF in Port 1·1oresby. Since the Dll.SF director had 
observed the taro disease in the Shortlands and on Eougainville, Suck-
ling reported that there was lIlittle doubt that this is the same 
organism which has been responsible for the failure of the taro crop 
?4 in the Shortlands."- In the memorandum where Suckling announced the 
identity of the disease, he reiterated that he still could not under-
stand the change of position cn the part of the shortlands headmen and 
missions people which occurred after his initial visit in March. All had 
agreed that it had been impossible to bring any taro plants to maturity 
because of the disease and th~t therefore the proposed measures were not 
unreasonable. They also had L1dicated at that time, that the disease 
was a new arrival but now were claiming that the dise~se had been around 
a long time. Later in a letter to the DASF in Port Noresby, Suckling 
tried to explain this change in attitude: 
It would appear that the Shortland people used the disease as 
an excuse for failure to plant up their gardens during the 
period following the abar:.donm.ent of large dumps of food by 
our troops. In the absence :lere of a...."1 Agronomist, our re-
actions to the first alarming reports ',;ere to organize a 
plant destruction campaign pendin,:; more expert. advice. He 
also endeavoured to qU:1.r:mtine the Isla.nds affected. Seeing 
their crops upl'C'oted had the effect of cha.!1ging the minds of 
the people, who recalled that the disease was not a new 
<l' 
.. 
•. 
arri val--that it had always been with them--and that it 
was nc",., abating. 25 
In Harch of 1947, Suckling had sent plant a..'ld soil specimens 
9 
gathered from his recent tour to B. E. V. P~rham, the Fiji DeparGment 
of Agriculture Economic Bota..'list; in order to have the taro disease 
identified. By July 10,1947, because he still had not received a 
reply, Suckling w70te to Parham to inform him of the recent identifi-
cation of the taro disease. 26 Parh~~ responded on August 19 in a 
letter to Suckling by first noting that the taro disease had been 
identified as Phytophthora coZocasiae and adding: 
A study of the specimens you forwarded and the s~~ptoms 
described by you tend to confirm this determination. I 
have been unable to carry out any inoculation studies for 
'')7 lack of proper quarantine and laboratory facilities.~ 
Parham went on to describe Phytophthora coZocasiae and its world-
wide distribution. He acknowledged that he had consulted Butler 
regarding the description and characteristics of the disease. By 
checking E. J. ~utler' s Fungi and Disease in PZants (the source 'J.sed 
previously by O'Connor) one can see that Parham was quoting from this 
book almost verbatum. Apparently Parham could not or simply did not 
identify the disease until he was given the name from Suckling. But ,\ 
once it was suggested that Phytophthora might be the causative agent, 
Parham re-examined the specimens and Suckling's description and 
effectively verified that such was the case . 
Responding to a request by the Secretary to the Government, 
Suckling, on May ]8, 1950, wrote a report on Phytophthora coZocasiae. 
He recounted briefly the history of the disease in BSIP since it was 
10 
first reported in 1946. He explained wby the taro destruction program 
in the Shortlands he.d been lmdertal':.en, tha:: it had :'ailed, and that 
although th'2 :3.isease had repor-sec..ly abated to? certain extent, it, '"as 
on Choiseul and then su.rnm.ed up hi.s vie'rls on ::he generel nature of the 
disease: 
.... in 1948-49 t:he fungus 'tlas reported to be causing wide-
spread damage to taro on Choisetll. ::: investigated "his on 
a 5-week tour of the island, cOnLl.r;:led that the fungus 'Has 
indeed Phytopat;;wloC[ cclocasiae~ failed ::'0 eS':;ablish that the 
outbre3.k '''[2.S due to infected plant material introduced from 
Bougainville or the Short lands , and conel uded (a) that gi'ren 
faV'ourable cli:n.atic and seasonal conditions (b) provided un-
healthy host planes ".jere available, particlila!'ly in neglected 
gardens, the disease '.;ould assert itself. I suggested further 
that under certain ccmdi:ions in any part of the Protectorate 
outbreaks could occur and this seems to beconfir:ned by the 
Fij i authorities 'Tho have recently been confronted "ith an 
entirely unexplained outbreak of N;ytophthora. co'Z-ocasicr:: on 
Viti Levu. I understand further that the l)eputy Direct.or of 
Agriculture Mr. R. E. Dwyer at Port Moresby, T. N. G. [sic] 
has eA~ressed a similar opinion in his statement that. the 
disease is in general ende::."lic, but given favourable conditions, 
heavy prolonged rain, hu.rnidi ty--cn poorly tended or ',.;ea.1.;: 
"8 plants,--it can reach epidemic prcportions.~ 
Sucklin~' s ab('ve report expressed the conclusions reached by the 
ESTP Department of Agriculture concerning the outhreak of Phytophthora 
eo7,oeasiae in the Western District of the :i3ritishSolomons. Apparently 
Suckling was assuming that the fun~JS had always been present in the 
environment and the latest c:,utbreak. had occurred quite by the cnance 
coincidence cf a nu.rnber of factors. This viewpoint and. other aspects 
of the taro tlit-;i1t in the British Solomons will be further exrunined 
after takinG a closer look at the D_LiGht on Bougainville. 
.. 
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As :previously noted, AHGAD had becone 8.ware of the taro bli,:::::t 0'-1 
Bougainvillc in early 1945 8...'1d had declared by Octcber that it ;,ad re-
portedly affected the whole of Bougainville-Buka. The earliest MiGAU 
patrol reports carne almost entirely from the' Kunua-Keriaka area of 
Western Bougainville. This is reasonable because in early 1945 large 
areas of Bougainville and all of 3tL"k:.a ',,"ere still occupied by Japar:ese 
forces. During the period of hostilities O~ Bougainville, the flli'1ctions 
of the Al'l"GAU patrols "were to collect information and do what they could 
to rescue natives from occupied areas."29 Refugees from occupied areas 
were settled into camps by ANGAU personnel until the war was over, when 
they were helped to resettle on or near their former village sites. 
Some villages in the Allied-controlled areas were started on rehabili-
tation programs even before the oL'icial close, of thE: war in September 
of 1945. Thus ANGAU personnel were very interested in seeing to it that 
villagers became self-sufficient and independent of government rations 
as soon as possib'le. When the taro disease was first discovered, ANGAU 
realized that it was potentially a cause of some concern. ANGAU Capt. 
J. M. Joyes, the first to record the outbreak of the disease, stated in 
an April patrol report from Klli'1Ua, "A close watch will be kept as 
further development of the disease will have serious consequences in 
the food supplies.,,30 
The disease was first reported in Kunua only--early patrols to the J 
Keriaka area found no signs of the blight. Lieut. J. G. Mackay re-
ported in May, 1945 on a patrol to Keriaka, "Taro is healthy and shows 
no sign of the blight that has affected part of Kunua.,,3l However an 
October patrol report by Lieut. Mackay to the same area stated that in 
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most of the villages -visited, taro had been seyerely affec-::ed 'by the 
blight. 32 It is difficQlt to say that this represented the actual 
spread of the disease since as will be sho'~, its seve~ity at a given 
time and ple.ce is highly de~endent upon local environmental conditions. 
In the areas of prolonged Japanese occ~pation, tar~ was extremely 
scarce, ewing to <!apanese raiding of indigen011s gardens and the Jap2-'1ese 
practice of consuming not only the t~ro corms but leaves and stems as 
well. The following excerpt f~o~ a September 1945 Patrol Report on the 
Rotokas-Keriaka area is representative of conditions then prevailing in 
many sections of B01.!gainville-Buka: 
Food position is generally poor, those who remained during 
occupation have just sufficient ~o maintain an existence 
but variety is lacking as Japs took all the taro they could 
find and cut down the coconuts •.... Many sac sac [sago] palms 
have been destroyed by arty fire ... Lack of manpower and the 
possibility of occupation of gardens has been all against 
their clearing large areas. Efforts are being made to en-
courage the people to plant sac sac, coconuts, bananas, taro 
and paw paw but supplies of root stock are scarce. 33 
Similar reports came from NagoViSi,34 the Eivo-Banoni area,35 
~6 
and from B1.L.~a.-' 
By the end of 1945 ANGAU was aware of the la~k of taro planting 
material and of the existence of the blight throughout Bougainville-
Buka. In a letter to the Regional fu1GAU Headquarters at Lae in October, 
1945, the Bougainville ANGAU District Officer, Maj. W. J. Read, men-
tioned a "long-standing requisition still unfulfilled" for seeds and 
planting material for indigenous gardens. He also noted that Capt. 
O'Connor's visit concerning the taro disease had indicated that the 
"times were against any practical combatant achievement. II But he 
added, liThe tiI:le is now ripe for the posting of a full-time agriculture 
•• 
. --
staff here; for only applied expert handling will erad:.cate the 
pest. ,,37 Read I s requests and suggestions went unheeded. It '..ras not 
until after t!1e Provisional Administration had taken control that a 
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full-time agricultural -officer was posted to' Bougainville and ne~ plfu,t-
ing material provided from ot!1er districts. 
~e Provisional Administration took over from ANGAU on Bougainville 
9'6 38 on 1.fay 21, 1 4 • There was almost a complete change of personnel as 
many members of ANGAU on Bougainville returned to their pre-war jobs, 
or went south. It is difficult to determine how ouc!1 information was 
passed on to the new personnel by the outgoing ANGAU officers. At least 
the patrol reports remained so that the new officers had some idea of 
what had gone on before their arrival. The new Administration personnel 
apparently were not able to take any immediate action regarding the 
sho.rtage of taro and other problems resulting from the hardships of the 
war. 
On October 9, 1946, Col. J. K. Murray, the new Administrator, 
convened a conference to acquaint Papua-New Guinea Missionaries with 
the policies of his administration. Representatives from every mission 
along with the heads of the various government departments met for five 
days in Port Moresby.39 Bishop Thomas Wade and Monsignor James Hannan 
represented the Catholic Mission on Bougainville. During the course of 
the conference, Msgr. Hannan brought up the deplorable conditions which 
he said then existed on Bougainville due to the hardships of the war. 
La.ter published statements indicate that Msgr. Hannan was especially 
concerned about an exceptionally high death rate which was continuing 
months afte:r the war hud ceased. He attributed the tremendous number 
.i 
of deat~1s to a shortage of prope:.: foc;d '3:.:.p~L_es ?.nd reQuested that 
the government ::-ush in emersency suppl:;'-=:-; i:nmediate1y. 
The Admini strator '<las apparently .mc7ed by !,1s gr. Hannan's repres en-
tat ion of the situation. On NOVf::aber 18. 1946> the Sydney Morning 
Herald reported ttat, "A Govern .. "'Iler,t l~ood ship is hurrying to Bougain-
ville, where 20,000 nati ';es are facing hu..'1ger." '.:'he ship Was to ci.n:le 
the isl~'1d delivering and redistributing food. The article me~tioned 
that the people of central and southern BO'.lgainville hal suf:::~ered. r::ost 
from the war-tiffie devastation emd continued 'with ·the following details: 
A disease has attacked taro. a main native food, and 
the natives have had to rely cm sweet potato crops. ~-lild 
pigs are ma.~ing inroads on these. At the urgent request 
of the New Guinea Administration, t· ... o tons of maize seed 
from· the Atherton Tableland, coconuts, and several tons 
of peanuts, rice, and pumpkin seed from other districts, 
were loaded for Bougainville. 
A Government offici8..l, !·tr. W. P.. Ovenst0ne, flew to 
Cairns yesterday to buy pigs, favls, and even dGgs for 
the Bougainville natives .1'hey will be used £'or breecling. 
On a November 5, 1946 radio broadcost over 9PA Fort Moresby) the 
DASF director, Mr. W. Cottrel2.-Dorm.er:, bad announced that: 
... Assistant District Agricultural Officer, ~. Gordan 
Wilson, will shortly travel to Schano, in Bougainville, 
where he will establish a piggery and a seed farm in 
order that a practic8..l contribution might be made in 
helping to overcome the serious malnutrition from which 
many natiyes of thj7t region are suffering as a result 
of enemy activity.~O 
Patrol reports from early in 1947 shov that patrol officers began 
immediately to distribute -the ~aize, peAllut, ~'1d pumpkin seeds vhich had 
been delivered by ship. 41 In Noverr.ber, 1946, J. P. l,'lhi te, the ADO :.1t 
Kieta, received a "li::li ted 3..r:lOur.c; of tar:) from Lae." Such planting 
" 
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material had been on request for months.- ;{l'1i te pla.'1ted. nost of c.::is 
taro in a plot near the Kieta Sub-district Headquarters and Ghe ~emainder 
was distributed to suitable villages for trials and possib~e multipli-
t . 42 ca ~on. 
Most of the above-mentioned acti vi ty see:"J.s to have been stimcl.ated 
by Msgr. Hannan's remar1{s made at the ~·1issions conferr'mce. Tl"1e newly 
created DASF had announced thaT its aim was to tlbl4ild. up a comm1L."li ty 
bas~d ona type of rural peasant proprietorship, for nutritional im-
t 11 f . ,,4 3 H' d' + h provemen as we as or econOmlC purposes. owever, urlng ~"e 
first year of the Provisional A~~inistration, little had been accom-
plished toward the implementa.ion of an announced extension program. 
By June 30,1947, few new projects had been started Oi..-ing to the need 
to rehabilitate pre-war installations, and the total number of staff 
then employed throughout Papua and New Guinea was only 35. 44 Thus, 
when a full-time agricultural officer was assigned to remote Bougain-
ville District to set up an agricultural station where none had 
previously existed, there is strong reasoti to believe that such a move 
was a direct result of Msgr. Hannan's intervention. 
Evidently Msgr. Hannan was not satisfied that the Administration's 
response had been adequate. While visiting Melbourne in March and 
April of 1947, he continued his requests for assistance and food sup-
plies for the Bougainville people. His pronouncements received wide-
spread publicity. The following short article appeared in the New York 
Times Oil April 2nd. It was datelined Melbourne, Australia, Apr. 1. 
Since the .Japanese captured Bougainville in the Solomons 
early in 1942, nearly one quarter of the population of the 
island has perished and more than one-half of these have 
died since Japan's capitulation in August, 1945, according 
,l 
to ?~sgr. Ja."'Iles fIsr.I1an, :"OrE.2r ,·~.~t,~".:.::.li~~;. Ji.:"'cc-:.:;r ,~,:. al} 
Rom:l!1. Catholic mi3si::JDS in +,:,1":-2 ~. - ." - - -. I.ls{;:-:-. ~~f!.:~r~an, 'wl-: r) 
has been working 3.S a ri2issi.")nc~~~::,/ .i.:: -:-~::~.; :3()lc=0:1~-: c~arin~~ 
the past year, and who is nmr -,risi ting A'.lstralia, is try-
ing to persuade the Government "co :,:,'.:sn food to the starving 
natives. 
Bougainville, ~e said., :jo::~all~r 3u:;ported 35,OCO natives 
wi th imports of ::-ice. For nea:r<l.y ~h.ree years 'Vlr.:.i.2.e t11e 
Ja'1,:::12se ",;ere there t~ce iS~3.n::l su.?p·crte1i 90,!JOC. 
!~=-l t~n.::: garcle::r.s h9,ve bee:J. ·2es~:'royed a:ld e\rer:,~ cle9.ring 
-ooffibe~l. To lle:.p the Allies., ~·~s5r. rla:nn3..~·~ sc~:'._l, t:-ie n8.ti-.;es 
declared '<lar on t:le JaIla:'c,:,se a:1d :::.b8.1:dcned t::e~ir so.r'iens 
and vills.ges. 
Disease, :he said, lS n0~~r ta}:ing toll of t;-;,e ~.1r:d.er!1ouri.shed 
natives. In the center of The island they are not strong 
enough to remake theil' gardens. :'~ear.;"Thile, he said, natives 
are dying in hundreds. He added that the situation was much 
the same in New Ireland. 45 
Similar articles appeared 
,. ~ 47 Pacific Is Zands ;~lom;;Hy, ' 
in .\ustralia.n 46 newspapers, and in 
M.x. E. J. Ward,; Minister for External 'l'erritories, quickly re-
sponded to !v1sgr. Hannan's pronoancemer.ts: 
I recently inquired into conditions on 30ugainville and 
found that rehabilitation had already made conside:;"ab1e 
progress since the restoration of chril adiTIinistrat:i.on 
in May, 1946 .... Latest reports ir:dicate that there is 
sufficie:lt native food, Si.lch 2.S rr:aize, sugar, sabo and 
sweet potatoes for present req'.lirements. The despatch 
of emergency foodstuffs to Eougainville and relief 
arrangements which the authori~ies in the territory had 
planned were p~t into opera-tion during October and 
November last. 48 
On April 3rd, Bougainville District Officer, Raleigh Farlow, also 
,~ 
replied to Msgr. Hannan's statements. After declaring that recent 
patrol reports showed there were plenty of peanuts, sweet potatoes, and 
other "native" foods, he admitted that, th,=re was "certainly a shortage 
of tl1ru du<: Lo 
"the only food not in full supply," He said tho.t because of ill-
" 
treatment by the Japanese, the people of Bougainville were in "poor 
condition" when Australia took over. The people had been fed for a 
year by ANGAU and were gradually regaining their strength, said Farlow. 
He granted that the death-rate had been high in certain areas due to 
starvation caused by the Japanese, but concluded that the position was 
changing rapidly and the current death-rate was "not out of the 
49 
ordinary." 
In a reply to the Minister and :he Districk Officer, Msgr. Hannan 
attempted to clarify his views: 
... Monsignor Hannan said that the natives on Bougainville had 
some food, but not the right kind of food. They we~e not 
literally starving, they were dying as a result of malnutrition. 
He said that taro was the main food of the inland Bougainville 
native. He might have ample supplies of other foods, but they 
were barely sufficient to keep him alive in his present mal-
nourished condition. They had always had meat and fats before 
the war, and they would continue to die off in certain areas 
until they got them again. 
"The Administration of Papua-New Guinea admitted this when 
it bought up pigs, goats and fowls for the Bougainville natives 
last December, II said Magr. Hannan. "They have been at Cairns 
since. The Government can't get them across because there are 
no ships. It should fly them across instead of expecting the 
natives to exist on substitute foods."SO 
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The Administration must have been more than a little disturbed about 
all the unfavorable publicity it was receiving from the controversy 
stirred up by Msgr. Hannan. It was ironic that this administration was 
now being accused of neglecting the malnourished and weakened "natives" 
of Bougainville. For too many European residents, the Administration was 
achieving a reputation for placing "native" interests before all else 
(espe~ially before resident European interests) and trying to create 
"a new paradise on earth for natives."Sl In fact Mr. Ward and 
.. 
Col. ~f.urray were deeply CClrID tted to the ·,lelfare of the ind.iGene·us 
it was guided by a group of n'well-meaning and honest, but thoroughly 
. +. al I ,,52 ~mprac~~c peop e. 
While the Europea.n residents or Territorians (as they liked to call 
themse::"ves) had few good things to say, the missions of the territo!"y 
seemed., in general, to be favorably di sposed towards the Ad..l'!lini stration. 
After all, the Administrator l1ad consulted ,,,i th tben in October, and had 
scheduled another l'·1issions Conference for !-fa:r, 1947. It had been re-
ported that the October conference had fostered a "spirit of cooperation 
and mutual understanding ... between [the] Missions and [the] Administra-
tion."53 Thus the Administration must have seriously considered the 
likelihood that even Msgr. Hannan's renewed attacks were motivated by 
something other than a mere attempt to discredit the Administration. 
After Msgr. Hannan's renewed criticisms of April, the Administra-
tion in early May '.ras ina quandary. On April 28, the Acting Government 
Secretary, Mr. Melrose, wrote a memorand'.ll'n to the Acting Administrator 
concerning the Bougainville controversy and what the government's 
response ought to be. 54 Melrose wrote that the Bougainville question 
was very confusing and that he was not at all happy about it. wbile the 
Department of District Ser'rices and Native Affairs (DDS a.."ld NA) said 
there was ample food and the death rate was no longer exceSSive, the 
,\ 
Missionaries insisted that the numbe~ of dea~hs was still abnormally 
high. "Bishop Wade assigns the cause to 'epidemic' and lowered resist-
ance due to the wartime conditions, ~~d the psychological effect due to 
the luck of taro," reported MelrOSe, and "Hsgr. Hannan ascribes it to 
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disease malnutrition and in some cases sta:-vation." Melrose h~J.d no 
information on the nature of the "epidemic" or whether or not it was 
of recent origin. 
Melrose recounted that although the difficulties had been great, 
some things had been accomplished since the issue was first raised. A 
fair Qu~~tity of seed had been distributed and more seed and sone pigs 
and poultry were soon to be Se.::J.t. Regarding the taro disease, Melrose 
wrote, " ... [as] a result of Hr. T;ilson 1 s [the new agricultural officer 
in Bougainville] work it is now possible to identii"J the disease, and 
Mr. Dormer informs me he is sending Mr. Dwyer [Dir., Div. of Ag. 
Extension] to Bougainville tc direct the steps necessary to combat it." 
Melrose suggested that b.~cause of the severity of the war-time 
hardships in Bougainville, a special approach to rehabilitation might 
be in order. The first task should be for experts from the DDS and NA, 
the Dept. of Public Health, ~~d the DASF to visit the district so that 
specific plans could be drawn up and implemented. He felt that the 
Mission and the Administration might be nat cross purposes" and the 
Administration might be "falling into the error of believing things to 
be better than they really are. 11 He concluded that the matter could 
only be resolved IIby investigation by senior officials on the spot. 1t 
Finally Melrose expressed concern that the Mission might be exploit-
ing the situation in order to make the Administration luok bad: 
There is another aspect of this thing, which to me is dis-
quietinc, a~d that is the persistence with which the Mission 
keeps raising it. You will see from the file that it was 
mentioned by Msgr. Hannan at the conference with the mission-
aries held in Port Horesby in October and also that it has 
appeared in the New York ':'imes. I am wondering, therefore, 
if there is a plan by the Roman Catholic hierarchy to dis-
credit the work of the Administration in American eyes. 
I am not awa~e c-f t!·:.e: -7:ie--l.'::p be~:t,reen the r'l~::"ist ;,1:'3S:'<:-;~-: .,;:.nri 
the A'1lericarl nie~~;..~clJ-J" of t~e :L.:·~:~>-.;.~~ Gattolic G1.-1arch b~lt 'rlE 
know that t:!1e Bishop is an f~;1~::ri2G.:r~ ·snd that "be.fore th~2 vTaY 
a highly tlualifieJ. rr.o..n in the person of Dr. ::ermes sey ·"as 
detached from Ar:erica :~or ',{Qr:'>: in +,he Bou~ai,.,,'ille disr;ric~ ... 
!~lsgr. Hanna.~ i3, of coul--=e, &'1 /1.ustralian, r:.nd -but a r~cent 
arrival in the field. T.-:e tao ~ "\las j.etG.ched fr:::·a i~~:portant 
Church 'work in Australia ... If' -:":!J :~es'::3 8,rcc E:Jt cro,_;~dl2S:::3, 
the need for the l·.c'..ninistration to appr:Jac:'1;:.he tcsi: or' 
rehabilitation in 30ugainv-ille as a se-pe..l"'s.""C: . .: L.Ulde[ta_~!"~i:·lg 
becomes more necessary. 
by senior officials on the spa-: If ... as the cnly ',ray tel settle th.; isscl"? 
Melrose then called. a meeting of departn:er::t heads in his office on Hay 
16 in order to discuss plarls for the upcoDing visit to Bouga:'nville 
District. it was decided that Col. Jt.\u-ray, himself, should lead this 
"fact finding" mission 2~""d that he ·,..ro1.lld be 3.c.:.corr;';':;s'nied b;l Dr. John 
Gunther, Principal ?·ledical Officer; Mr. J. H. McDonald, Asci:3tant 
Director of the DDS &''1d NA; Lt. -Col. J. S. Gri:nsh2 .... , Superintendant of 
Police; and Hr. W. Cotrell-Dorner, Director of the DAS?55 The nec-
essary arrangements were made and the District Officer at Soh ana was 
notified that ":.he party would arrive cn June 3. For some lJllforeseeYl 
reason the party did not arrive 1.L'1til :-iye days later. PIl1 desc:dbed 
the ensuing events: 
Actually, he was due to arrive on June 3, on which day the 
usual out-station windo ... dressing had been applied; the 
donning of s-ciff starched whites, tr:e dl'ill rehearsals of 
the native police arlO. the general 'what-have-you preparatory 
to the arrival of any very high official at a Territorial 
out-post .... None of these preparations was in evidence '..!hen 
His Honour ·wal.1{,ed ashore from the ::,.ine-s ... eeper "Condamine," 
to be welcomed by a slu-prised mr::di:.:al assistant :'nstead of 
a senior officer--who, l:owc'rer, soon put ir. a.."1 ap:pcaro..nce, 
and, being an old soldier ~t 10Ylg experience, carried off 
the situati,:m with :J.plof.'"!l.J./ o 
.' 
D. '8., ,,~ .... - . 
visi~ r-;u...-::a XUIlla, K:'.:::.a, Eu:;"!, and ':'c:::'okina, whe:::'e -:hey diserr:ba:::xeel. 57 
on :foot, en 
Solo::,o::s '..;:-:e:re -:ney r..e-::. .Ii th ?rot,:ctorate of.ficials. * ':'hen -:r.ere -"[8.3 
a d~y and a half stay at K:eta and two Qays at Sohano. 
a jeep trip to Ga.gG:. Villa.Ce en Buka ar.d briefly vis:' ted 'the west co3.s~ 
of BoucainviL.e b(::;"ore d.epar-::.ing for ?.::.baul on July 3. 
The party :-:ad visj.ted I:".ission personnel and pld.nte:::'s throughout 
30U[!;ainville-:?~J-:a, so ·";~Q.t cur:::'ent <iifficulties mibht be explained and. 
grieval1ces aired. A. DASF report on the survey of S01..::t1-.WGst Bcugainville 
revealed the following findings: 
General imp:::'essions of the people and their villages; generally 
well contented. 
~ealth: A. :::;hysical exar.:ination of the 5,431 people '"as conducted, 
which espe8ially sought the clinical manifestations of die~ defi-
c:.a:::.cy. ':;.'1'.e resu2.ts of :.his eX8.':li::ation fail to :::'e':ea1 a:::.y abnormal 
disease pattern, except pe:::,haps a higher degree of anemia .... 
Signs of diet deficiency: ':'r.e people looked healthy and well feel ... 
1,.-.'~.s :~c~c. b::; ::>bservation and ~\lestioning 
'that 3....'1 area of :':::'0::1 _ ~o 2 i:.l.:::r(;.3 per adul t o:.~ food c:::,ops ' .... as 
tully pla.ntec. a..'1d in ·: ..... ~·ious S7-.:.tes of ::-.8:",...ri ":.y and that add.i-
tional s.reas ',,·ere beinG p::":..:.;:tec. or prepa:::'ed ::8r pla..'1tinG ... T:ne 
Japanese syste:::: o:~ pl2:_tir.Z ~8.u ~-:.au [s"eet po:.ato] i::. hibh 
raised 'beds l':c,;i ;)een adopted to 2. limited ex-::.ent by one or two but 
generally s~'c:~·:::,C; t;1e na:.L"es :'1:,::,':e continued with their prewar 
*See page 8 fer earlier reference to this meeting. 
methods because, they clain, they a.re l.i:::;j:tec. almost 
entirel:y- to the digging si:icl-: as 2 ..:1 agricultu.r~-u ir:..plerrler:t.. 
Pests and Diseases:· In agreement with earlier ~eports a 
fungus disease, or blight of taro was found to be wide-
spread, not only in cultivated taros cut usa in i.ndigenous 
bush species. This disease is . caused by PhytophtholYl 
colooasiae and has long been known in Indi!.., Southern Asia 
and Indonesia. Mr. G. Harvey of the Departnent of Agri-
culture, Stock and Fisheries will re!:lain at Sohane for 
some time, and make periodical visits, to carry out a 
prograr.L'11e of investigations i1:. order to determine whe-::~ler 
resistant varieties are available or .,hether simple -:::ontrcl 
measures suitable for local conditions can be devised. The 
movement of taros out of Eougainville should be prohibited. 59 
The findings of the Adoinistrator's trip to Bougainville verified 
the existence of the taro blight but failed to back up Msgr. Hannan's 
claims regarding malnutrition and an excessive death-rate. The findings 
concerning the taro disease are difficult to dispute, especially '"hen 
one considers that the DASF Director, W. Cottrell-Dormer, and George 
Harvey~an agronomist, were present during the survey of Southwest 
Bougainville. Col. Murray, himself, was an agricultural expert of con-
siderable note. "For 22 years he had been Principal of Gatton Agricul-
tural College in Queensland, as well as Professor of Agriculture in the 
60 University of Queensland." This background in agriculture undoubtedJ.y 
accounted to a certain extent for his interest in the problems in 
Bougainville. 
The survey's medical findings from ~he physical examination of 
5,431 people in a period of nine days, however, are more difficult to ,\ 
substantiate. It is possible that the findings were accurate concern-
ing the absence of any unusually high incidence of disease and malnu-
trition, while noting t~e high incidence of anemia, but the reliability 
of such a cursory examination must remain open to question. On the 
., . 
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other hand the observations of the Principal Medical Officer, Dr. John 
Gunther, cannot be ignored. Certainly by the time of Dr. G~~ther's 
visit in mid-l947, the actual cases of extr~me malnourishment and 
starvation reported at the close of the war would no longer have Deen 
evident. 
The effects of Msgr. Hannan's pronouncements and his possible 
motives for making them require sone discussion. It is possible that 
Msgr. Hannan had ~erely been reporting the situation as he saw it. 
Since he had arrived on Bougainville in 1946, the initial sight of 
Bougainvillians who had suffered severely from the war may have in-
fluenced his thinking on the:cssue. Shortly after the war, the Native 
War Damages Compensation Corom:: t.tee, composed of J. V. Barry, J. L. 
Taylor, and the well-known anthropologist, H. I. Hogbin made the follow-
~ng statements: 
•.. in Bougainville those [indigenes] brought into our lines 
are literally skin and bone .•.. one quarter of the population 
of Bougainville may have perished .... The invasion and war 
activities ••. have had effects upon the natives so calamitous 
and so far removed from anything with which their experience 
and w~ of life have made them6familiar, that it is beyond 
their power to cope with them. 1 
It is significant that Bishop Wade did not openly disagree with 
Msgr. Hannan. According to Secretary Melrose, Bishop Wade had agreed 
that the death-rate was abnormally high but gave a different explanation 
" for it. He thought that because of the people's weakened condition due 
to wartime suffering, disease epidemics had taken a higher than usual 
toll. Bishop Wade also believed that the loss of taro had had so great 
a psychological impact that it had contributed to a higher death-rate. 
\fuether Bishop 'I-iade thought :lcsgr. Hannan was over-re3.cti;-,g L:; not 
clear. It does seem likely however, that the Bishop certainly did 
agree that the health of the Bougainvillians was not yet back to no:IT.lal.. 
Many observers, both past and presenT;, have felt that ;·rsgr. Hanna.'1' s 
claims were exaggerated. Certain members of the Cathalic Mission on 
Boug~.dnville who were present at the .... vlme 0:'"' the con-croversy stated 
that in their view, Hsgr. [{ar:nan had over--=:-::phasized -che severity of 
th d · ... · 62 • e con l. "l.ons . Certainly otr.er Europeans on B~·!.lgai!1ville at the 
time agreed. The July~ 1947, issue of PIN carried 8.;.'1 article from an 
unidentified Bougainville reader, claiming that reports concerning 
starvation on Bougainville were exaggerated. The article asserted that, 
"Thenati ves lost .all their taro crops; but plenty of }l au-k au , tapioc, 
peanuts, coconuts and fresh fruit remained to ~hem, and they appear to 
be just as heal. thy as before the war. II 
If Msgr. Hannan did in fact exaggerate the severity of the condi-
tions, what was he trying to accomplish? It seems i~probable that 
there WaS a plot to discredit the Administration in the eyes of the 
Americans as M~lrose had feared. A much more plausible possibility 
would be that Msgr. Hannan was attempting to draw attention to Bougain-
ville, to "put it on the map," so to speak. Bougal.nville District was 
the tail-end of the territory and therefore subject to neglect by the 
Administration. As a result of Nsgr. Hannan's eff'orts, people from J 
Melbourne to New York knew of Bougainville's problems. The Adminis-
trator, Principal Medical. Of'ficer, Director of the DASF, and Superin-
tenda.nt of' Police had all visited the district. An agricultural officer 
had been assigned there permanently and an agronomist temporarily. A 
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full-time medical officer had been assigned to the district, as a re-
sult of requests made at the October, 1946 ~lissions Conference. 63 Food, 
seeds, and planting material had been sent to help the people regain 
their prewar standard of living. For a brief period then, Msgr. Hannan 
had managed to get Col. Murray's Administration to t~~e a special 
interest in Bougainville. Cottrell-Dormer acknowledged this when he 
wrote in April, 1948, " •.. Bougainville is of particular interest to this 
Administration. ,,64' Thus if Msgr. Hannan did exaggerate his reports to 
draw attention to Bougainville, his efforts can be counted as largely 
successful. 
The Administration's activities to combat the taro blight began 
with the previously mentioned* announcement by the DASF Director con-
cerning Gordan Wilson's transfer to Bougainville District in November, 
1946, as the District's new assistant agricultural officer. One of 
Wilson's first projects was to gather taro planting material from 
Northern Bougainvil1e and start an experimental plot of taro near the 
new Agricultural Station at Komarau on the Buka side of Buka Passage. 
The plot 'Was begun in January, 1947, but by April, Wilson reported that 
every plant had been infected with the disease. 65 Wilson concluded 
that the planting material had been contaminated, although it had 
appeared clean and had been planted in a fairly isolated location. In 
order to proceed further, Wilson had to know what disease he was deal-
ing with. He therefore dispatched diseased leaf specimens to Port 
MOresby in hopes of having the disease identified. In his April report 
he also gave a description of the disease's symptoms. 66 Strangely the 
DASF had failed to inform Wilson of the identity of the blight-causing 
*See page 14 
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organism. Perhaps B. A. O'Connor's earlier identification hed been 
lost or simply overlooked, because ~elrose reported that the identity 
o~ the disease was finally learned from Wilson's descriptions. This 
is all the more di~ficult to understand because after the war O'Connor 
was employed by the DASF as an entomologist. He was in fact then at 
K t d ' h th ,..,. 67 erava engage In researc on •. e pes"Gs O.l. cocoe, 
In May, Wilson had given a su:nmary of his obse:::-vations on the taro 
;,-'= d th . t' d· .... · .., , d N .... h 'B "1' 68 ~sease an e eX1S lng con l~lons on DUKa an .orv.ern ougalnVl ~e. 
In June R. E. P. Dwyer, Director of the Division of Agricultural 
Extension, responded to Wilson's report: 
Your summary of obser~ations of the taro disease and genera: 
position in Northern .3ougainville is ncted with considerable 
int'erest, and the symptoms described are quite typical o~ 
Phytophthora coZocasiae, of which you have given a full des-
cription .• ' .• specimens of tbe disease sent from Sohano not 
arrived in Moresby as yet. b9 
There is no record of the specimens ever having arrived in Port 
Moresby. But the Department began referring to the taro disease as 
Phytophthora coZocasiae from then on. It should be recalled that DASF 
Director Cottrell-Dormer had informed Suckling at the J'me meeting in 
the Shorl-lands that the disease had been identified as P. aoZocasiae. 
Later developments confirmed that the disease had been correctly 
identified, but it is surprising that there is no record of any proper 
laboratory identification using a microscope during this period. 
The Assistant Agronomist, George Harvey, had accompanied Col. 
Murray and Cottrell-Dormer on the tour of Bougainville and was left at 
Komarau when the official party departed on July 3rd. Harvey was to 
determine whether or not blight-resistant taro 'Tarieties could be found 
'. 
~ng di~~eren~ t~r0 vnriet~e~ for trials ~as ~ade easier by the willing 
cooperation of t:le district o:.:.:~icers, the missions, a..'1d most signi-
Of:'"'icer 8:l::1o:l.:'lced tr"e purpose of Harvey f s werk a::d. rcq~ested that the 
ADO! s ce,:;in collectinG all edible taro variet ies ~or ship:-:-.ent to 
70 I··:omc.raUa T~1e !~-ssistar.t Jist::ict Officer ~or Kietn. Su"b-Distr:'ct, 
J. ? Hhite. was especially entb:siastic. He responded on August l4th, 
wri ting to the D.O. that he '..lould send with the :'irst available ship 
all the varieties he had collected. 71 Imite had received 13 varieties 
from Lae in ?;ove:nber and had::1anaged to collect 25 local varieties. a 
considerable acco:nplish~ent siven the wartine destruction of so ~any 
varieties by the Japanese _ He sta'ccd that the people of the Kieta area 
had shown :nuch interest in his taro :::;lantings and after hear-ing of the 
proposed work of the agronomist, were also developing an interest- in 
these activities. 'Vihite believed very strongly that eVE::rything possible 
should be done to corr..bat ,.;hat he called the "slioy wilt." He wrote, 
The re-establish:nent of this staple [taro] un a sound basis, 
~ree fran the da..'1ger of deci:nation by disease, is of outstand-
ing i::l.portance frc:':l the psychologic~l as well as the nutri-
tional standpoint. 72 
During the months of July a..~d Aug~st, Harvey established disease 
free plots of taro and organized various trials to test yesistance and 
methods of central. In a report on his work Harvey listed the following 
experirr.ents: 
1. Varietal ~eslst~'1ce. He was still collecti~g varieties in 
prcpuration for c():~,:;.r:.(,"!7'.r::;t of vc..rietoJ. trials early in 1948 by which 
.. '. 
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time he hoped to have received many ad.di tio:'.al varieties :trom Papua and 
Ne'W' Guinea. 
2. Chemical Control. Using a four-rnonth-diE'eased taro patch, he 
began a trial to check the effects of spraying with two different sprays, 
lime sulphur and "Bardinett". Each spray was tried on two sections, one 
with diseased leaves removed and the other with diseased leaves rerr,aining. 
A fifth section .ras included where d.iseased lE:aves were removed but no 
sprays applied. 
3. Alternate Hosts. He fOw'1d that disease on wild eo"ioeas:'a var-
ieties could be transfered to the domesticated varieties and vice versa 
but that local caladiurr..s failed to pick up the disease from any source. 
Further stUdies on alternate hosts were planned when more was kno',,"n of 
the disease I s habits. 
4. Spread of Disease on a leaf. After observing 14 taro· leaves 
and making some 100 drawings, he determined that the method and rate of 
spreading was dependent upon the position of the parent infection on the 
leaf. He planned to eventually study the spread of the disease in the 
plant and in the field. 
5. Spread of Disease in the Soil. Soil in five gallon dr1.2ID.S was 
contaminated with diseased leaves and planted with disease-free taro. 
The plantings were made progressively in different drums whose soil had 
been contaminated at the s~e time, to check the longevity of soil con-
tamination. As a control a certain percentage of the drums contained 
no diseased leaf material. 
6. Crop Rotation. Taro gardens were selected for rotation trials 
tq begin after taro was mature. The rotation of tobacco and corn, then 
.. 
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peanuts, then rice, and finally back to taro was to be tried. 
7. Crop Sanitation. Certain villages were enc0uraged to practice 
it. Trials in designated areas were to begin when the taro became 
mature. 
8. Pathological History and Etiology. Nothing could be accom-
plished until laboratory equipment was made available. 73 
Besides the above experiments Harvey wanted to establish disease-
free taro plots throughout the district. He wrote: 
From a psychological point [of view] and from a prestige 
angle for both the Department and Adlninistration in general, 
it would be advantageous if we could estab)ish isolated areas 
of disease-free taro at Sub-District and mission centres. 
This WOulfr also be beneficial from an experimental point 
of view. 7 
Before leaving Bougainville towards the end of August, he had· es-
tablished two such plots, one on Sohano Island and another at Hanahan 
Mission. 75 
By early September, Harvey had returned to the Keravat experimental 
station after spending only two months on Bougainville. There is no 
record of Harvey ever having returned to Bougainville to finish the work 
he· started. In a lengthy exchange of letters with DASF headquarters, he 
continually asked that taro from the rest of the territory be sent to 
Bougainville so that he might continue his work with disease-free speci-
mens. He also consistantly requested that laboratory equipment be made ,l 
available. After months of no action on either of these matters, the 
Director, Cottrell-Dormer, had to adlnit that little had been accomplished. 
He wrote in an April 1, 1948 letter to Suckling: 
He [Harvey] has not been able to return to =ougainville 
owing to his releavir..; I'Ir. F. C. Henderson, Agronomist in 
Charge, at Keravat. Other difficulties ::'ave also arisen, 
the principal one being staff shortt;1ge~6but it is intended 
to proceed with the work nevertheless. ( 
In an April 3rd letter to H2rvey, the Director gave a slightly 
different version but ad::ni -:te0.. that delays were li."'lavoid '1ble: 
It seems that for a TIw:'.ber of very practical reasons we 
cannot expect to ma.':e rapid progl'ess vii th research in taro 
disease; foremost aro.cng these reasons is sh-i.p:ping. I sug-
gest you build up your material at Keravat for later transfer 
to Bougainville as 7 shipping facilities do exist between that 
place and Rabaul. 7 I 
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Meanwhile Gordan Wilson renained at Buka Passage, presumably con-
tinuing with the experiments set up by Harvey. Whether or not ylilson 
achieved any significant results from any of the experiments is not 
known as no records could be found. Hilson .;rote occasional reports 
of his work, but he failed to mention any \oTork other than the resist-
ance trial plots, and a few general remarks stating that observations 
t 1 t · . 78 on con ro measures ',.;ere con lnulng. It seems that the initially 
enthusiastic plans to do something to re-establish taro as the staple 
crop began to suffer from delays and neglect. The idea that taro would 
be replaced by another crop appeared to becollle mor~ and more accepted. 
Wilson wrote in November. 1949: 
... it would appear tha~ sweet potato is now generally 
accepted by the natives as the staple and the desire to 
return to taro growing on a large scale is muct less fre-
quently expressed than was the case formerly ... ease of 
grow-iug sweet potato probably accounts for this and as 
medical evidence in a compar::'son of food values favours 
the sweet potato slightly, the change cannot be condemned 
from a purely material viewpoint. 79 
_\ 
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That the DASF had begun to give up on the idea of re-establishing 
taro is further emphasized by Wilson's trip to the Trobriands in Sep-
tember of 1950. The trip was made to gather seed yams for distribution 
throughout the district with the hope that Trobriand yams would at 
least parti~lly ~ake up for the loss of taro as the staple crop. By 
September 22, 1950, Wilson had distributed some 9 tons of seed yams 
80 between Buin, Kieta, Wakunai, Buka Passage, and the Carteret Isl~~ds. 
The taro problem seems to have been set aside by the Administra-
tion in general and by the DASF in particular until early in 1954 when 
Father W. Fingleton again brought it to the attention of the Dept. of 
, 
District Services and Native Affairs. As part of a list of several 
changes, Father Fingleton accused the Administration of failing to help 
the Buin people maintain their traditional pre-war staple crop of taro. 
In response to Father Fingleton, the Acting Director of DASF, F. C. 
Henderson, wrote: 
The taro in the Short lands and through Bougainville was 
de.stroyed by a disease immediately af'ter the war. However 
as yams, Kongkong taro, sweet potatoes and tapioca all 
grow readily in this area there is no reason why taro 
cannot be superseded by these crops. All reports indicate 
that this has been done. A boatload of yam planting mat-
erial was brought into this area from the Trobriands when 
the disease destroyed the crop . Sweet potatoes and other 
planting material were also distributed where necessary. 
It is many years now since the change over from taro as a 
staple to sweet potatoes. I understand that resistant 
strains of native taro are again appearing through the 
area. This is normal as invest~gations have shown that J 
through the Short lands and Bougainville every 20 years or 
so, taro disease flares up, destroys the more susceptible 
strains of taro grown, and then for several. decades permits 
the establishment of taro crops from the resistant strains 
that have survived the attack. It may well be that an 
erroneous impression of the food status of this area has 
been obtained by the native classification of taro as "food" 
and all other native vegetables purely as "packing". This 
'" 
<II. 
is a common attitude when taro eaters !cave been forced 
by varying circtL'Il2.t8.l1ces "Co cr.::L'1gc,':,heir staple diet to 
sweet potatoes or other root ::::rops.dl 
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The above statement represents the official view of the DASF re-
garding the taro blight as of early 1954. '",'bile not all members of the 
DASF ·..rould have agreed with thi s stateme7.1t, it is i7.1teresting that such 
a view was held by the acting director. Henderson's idea that one root 
crop is as good as a.'1other and there was "no reason" why taro could not 
be "superseded" represents a conside:-able lac~.;: of appreciation of .... ' :....ne 
cultural imIJortance of taro to the Bougainville people. The lack of 
evidence for his recurring or cyclical (llSeaSe theory will be shown 
later. 
.. 
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GrAFTER II 
The Scientific .N~ture ,:;1' t:Je Blight 
The dh;ease organism responsible for the taro blight on Bougain-
ville is the fungus. P;1ytophthoY'a coZocas-L-c-:';; Rac. The genus Phytophthora 
is responsible for a number of se:dous plant diseases affecting potatoes, 
rubber, cocoa, strawberries, li:::J.8. beam;, anc.3.vocados. Taro blight, 
caused by Phytophthora coZocas·i.ce~ is, accorc.ing to Truj illo, "comparable 
" d .".l. to late blight of potato in symptomatology an sever~ty. 
The nature of the taro blight and its causal organism is indeed 
strikingly similar to that of the potato bUght and its causal f'ungus, 
as readers of Cecil Woodhan-Smith's, The Great H2mgeY'~ on the Irish 
potato famine, will readily notice. 
In general the symptoms of this disease are quite distinct from 
other taro diseases such as viruses. The first symptom of the disease's 
presence on a taro plant is the appearance of small water-soaked lesions 
on the leaf. These lesions enlarge to form circular and irregular 
water-soaked spots, brown to purple in color. In the early stages the 
lesions exude drops of clear yellow liquid which turn dark red upon 
drying. Barely visible concentric rings of white fuzz can be seen near 
the periphery of the lesions progressively farther and farther from the 
2 
center. Field observations indicate that in the British Solomons the 
2 lesions increase in size at a rate of 2.2 cm per clay during the first 
,\ 
days of development. 3 The petioles (leaf stalks) can also become in-
fected with lesions. If this happens the tissues of the petiole oi'ten 
become so soft that they can no longer support the weight of the leaf 
and the leaf falls over or breaks off altogether. 
.. , 
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The white fuzz which surro~~ds the lesion is made up of the fungus 
itse·lf, growing and pro'ducing spores on the leaf surface. The spores 
produced are: known as zoosporangia and when mature, they easily break. 
off enabling them to spread to other areas of the same leaf, to other 
leaves, to other plants, or elsewhere, depending upon the action of 
wind and rain. They are often transported in water droplets which are 
splashed about the surrounding area or even washed into distant areas 
in streams or" water, especially during rain storms. In the presence of 
water droplets at the right temperature, the zoosporangia germinate and 
release up to eight smaller spores capable of motility and therefore 
called zoospores. The zoosporangia can also germinate by sending out 
germ tubes so that a new growth of fungus begins directly without the 
release of zoospores. Zoospores are very sensitive to temperature and 
humidity. They ar'e spread about in water droplets just as the zoospo-
rangia and require free moisture for germination which is also by means 
of germ tubes. Unde~ favorable conditions reproduced in a laboratory, 
a mature zoosporangia can release zoospores which can germinate in as 
little as 30 to 45 minutes. 4 
When· a zoospore germinates on a new leaf site, the germ tubes are 
extended down into the leaf structure directly through the surface of 
the leaf. The branching, threadlike body of the fungus, called the 
mycelium, now begins to grow inside the leaf itself. It is present in 
all parts showing external discoloration. Special projections on the 
mycelium extend into the leaf cells, enabling the fungus to nourish 
itself by absorbing the protoplasm of its host. As the leaf cells die 
in. the center of the lesion, the threads of the fungus advance outward 
t.o consume new tissue in ever-increasing concentric circles. 
The corm can also be attacked by the fu...'1gus 8..L'"ld in severe cases 
this often takes place. 5 
l 
It is difficult to know jus't he',; far the disease can spread without 
the help of man. As already mentioned~ once an infected plant is es-
tablished in a garden~ spores can rapidly cause in~ections in neighbor-
ing plants. DuriI:lg heavy rain storms, spo:r-angia and spores are apt to 
be blown or washed to more dist~~t gardens. But it is not likely that 
spores are carried very great dist~'1ces by the ";.rind, since their sur-
vi val is dependent on rigid temperature and humidity requirements. Also 
no species of Phy.tophthoX'a spores have ever been trapped out of the air 
despite many attempts to do 50. 6 Scattered stands of wild taro can act 
to help spread the disease by maintai!ling a source of infection. Since 
only CoZoaasia esauZenta or "true" taro has been fou...'1d to act as a host 
to the ~~gus, no 'other wild or domesticated plants can be held respon-
sible for s~reading the disease. 
The most likely means by which the blight is spread is through the 
distribution of infected planting material bymD.n. This holds true for 
long and short distances but applies especially to the spread of the 
bl:i.ght across such natural barriers as large expanses of salt water, 
high mountains, or arid regions. Wnen taro from a blighted region is 
imported into a disease free area, there is a likelihood that the fungus.l 
is growing in the planting material or that some ferm of the organism is 
present either on the plants or in accompanying soil. Most fungi have 
the ability to produce "resting spores" which are characterized by thick-
ened cell walls that allow the organism to survive unfavorable environ-
mental conditions. Such spores'have been found by growing PhytophthoI'a 
· , 
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coZocasiac in the laboratory. .A~though these "resting spores" have not 
yet been observed in soil or even on plfu~ting material, their possible 
role in the spread of the disease cannot be overlooked. 
The earliest record of Phytophthora colocasiae Rac. comes from Java 
in 1900. M. Raciborski first described the disease and :!:'eported its 
widesp:!:'ead distribution on Calocasia esculenta leaves as a parasite. 7 
In 1905, the well-kno~~ Bri~ish mycologist, E. J. Butler, found the di-
sease to be present in India. He later conducted a rather thorough 
study of the fungus in the laboratory as well as in the field. In 1912, 
he published a 28-page article which described in detail the life-cycle 
of the fungus as observed in laboratorJ cultures. Also published were 
many valuable field observations concerning the disease's symptoms and 
the conditions under which it becomes extremely severe. 
Butler reported that a Japanese scientist discovered the disease in 
Formosa in 1911.8 By 1916 the disease was reported to be in the Fhilip-
pines by Gomez. 9 Trujillo states that it was in Hawaii by 1920 and that 
it was probably introduced from Japan or Taiwan. 10 In 1932 the fungus 
was noted to be present in the Canton area of China. II After the clo~e 
of World War II when the disease was already a serious problem from Buka 
to the Northern British Solomons, it was thought to be present elsewhere 
in Papua New Guinea. In 1948, R. E. P. Dwyer, the head of the DASF Div-
ision of Agricultural Extension, wrote: "A very similar disease to that.\ 
in Bougainville is found around Finschhafen.,,12 On another occasion, the 
same year, he repeated the report of taro disease at Finschhafen and 
added, "I believe it [is] in isolated areas [of] New Britain and perhaps 
elsewhere in the l'erritory.,,13 The present DASF Chief Plant Pathologist, 
Dr. Dorothy Shaw, states that by 1956, Phy-f;ophthora coz.oe!..7.s-[,J.c ho.d :::e>:?n 
definitely idcnti:fied on I~ew Eritain and I';'~'." Irel.a..'l.cl D.nd that it .... as 
1 t f · d t b . t F" bh f' . 14 a er con ~rme 0 e presen~ a ~nsc .• a~e~. In :'948, the taro 
blight was reported to have cau,sed severe damage to crops on ~Hss[' .. n 
Island some 35 miles north .... est of Elh~a.15 
In order to complete the accott..'l.t of the kJ1CWn dis'~ri1)Ut ion or' 2. 
colocaS1:ae in \'iestern Nela.'1esig" its continued p~::;gression doWY. the 
Solomon Island chain should be noted. By 1959 the disease had reached 
Malaita,16 and in 1973 D. E. GoUifer reported that in the Solomons, ti~e 
disease was "widespread on all of the larger volcanic, Nela.'1e::;ian 
islands. II It was reported to be less prevalent on the ~;:1aller lo~,.; 
Polynesian islands within the British Solomons. 17 
As previously mentioned, B. E. V. Parham reported an outbreak of 
Phytophthora colocasiae in Fiji in 1948. Bo:::-deaux mixture was sp!:"ayed 
on the infected plots and good control was achie"red. The outb:::-eak ..... as 
completely unexplained as no new importations ()f ta!'O could be dis-
covered. 1S Since that time, remarkably, the:::-e is no record of the 
disease in any of the Polynesian groups to the east of Fiji, exceptbg 
Hawaii. The Micronesian Islands to the north however, have been 
affected. Trujillo reports that as of 1970, Saipan in the Ha!:"in...'1as, 
and Yap, Palau, Moen, Fefen, Po~ape, Nukuoro, and Kapingamar9.ngi of th~ 
Western and Eastern Carolines have all been invaded by the blight 
fungus. 19 And as of last year, 1973, the fungus had been introduced 
on the Island of Kusaie, because of the lack of adequate quarantine 
regulations. Reportedly the recent outbreak was q1:..ite se!:"ious, !)Ut~ing 
a halt to Kusaie r s export of taro to at.her islands. 20 
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Cecil Woodham-Smith, in her history of the Irish Potato Famine, 
wrote: "Where the potato blight originated and how it came to Europe 
is a mystery. ,,21 A similar statement could be made concerning the taro 
blight and its arrival on Bougainville. As with the potato blight one 
can only speculate that the disease developed near the origin of the 
crop. But in the case of taro, the exact area of origin is not known, 
except that it was probably somewhere in South or Southeast Asia. That 
the taro blight was first recorded in Java does not necessarily shed 
any light on where it might have originated. As for its introduction 
into Bougainville, with the lack of any firm evidence, there can only 
be speculation. 
Trujillo has suggested that the blight fungus reached the Solomons 
from Java via Australia and New Guinea. 22 With regard to proximity, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Micronesia would all be likely pros-
pects for the source of the disease's intr'oduction into Bougainville. 
Considering the distances involved, it is probably safe to assume that 
the disease arrived as a result of an introduction of planting material 
by a non-indigenous person; perhaps a Chinese trader, a Japanese fisher-
man, or a European planter or gardener. Micronesia mignt be considered 
a possible source if the time of the disease's first appearance there 
were known. Trujillo suggests that it reached Micronesia from the 
Philippines but gives no information on the time of its first appearance. 23 
There ru:e conflicting reports concerning when the disease first 
appeared on Bougainville. The idea that wartime activity caused the taro 
blight appears t() be almost universally held among the indigenous people 
of Bougainville-Buka. Among them, attributing the cause of the blight to 
the war effectively rules out, in most cases, any admission that the 
blight might have been present before the 'Nar. Against this popular 
indigenous belief, a number of Catholic missionaries on Bougainville-
Buka have asserted that the disease arrived shortly befo=e the beginning 
of the war. Bishop Leo L. Lemay stated that Bishop Wade (now deceased) 
? ! 
said the blight began a year or so before the war.~~ Father George 
Lepping claimed to have observed a taro disease in Northern Buka in 
1940. He remembered that the leaves would dry up and die and that very 
few corms developed. 25 Father F. Miltrup noticed the disease at Piano 
in the Buin area no later than 1942. He remembered the people calling 
his attention to it because it was new to them. He recalled that the 
disease produced brown spots on the leaves approximately 2 inches in 
diameter, eventually causing the leaves to die. 26 
It should be recalled that J. H. Allan, the District Conmissioner 
for the Western Solomons, during his 1947 visit to Bougainville, obtained 
a similar account concerning the presence of the blight before the war. 
He reported that prewar residents and officials claimed that the 
disease had been extant before the Japanese invasion. However his con-
elUSion, drawn from information provided by Bishop Wade, Father Beck, and 
Short lands headmen, that the "taro disease was nothing very new and that 
it had flared up many times in the past," is not backed Up by any other 
evidence. This conclusion seems to have resulted from a misinterpreta-
tion of Bishop Wade's view that the blight arrived a year or so before 
the war. All the evidence suggests that by maintaining that the disease 
was not new, the Short lands headmen, backed Up by Father Beck, were 
merely trying to save their culturally important taro varieties from 
destruction by the Agriculture Department. Allan mentioned the uproar 
- which began when certain irreplaceable "rare taro varieties" brought to 
the Short lands years berore, were destroyed: 27 The Shortlands people, 
like many or their neighbors to the north, probably cultivated a large 
number of taro varieties because their ancestors had done so, and fear 
of the ancestors' wrath might have motivated their- efforts to preserve 
these varieties. 28 Evidently Allan, Father Beck, and later even Agri-
cultural Officer Suckling, were taken in by this very effective ploy. 
Two years later the Shortlands "ChiefS" were claiming that the disease 
in fact·was a recent arrival and were blaming its intrcduction on the 
Japanese. 29 Also in 1949, Suckling reported that "old men" on Choiseul, 
"stated that the disease is new to them. ,,30 That is, it was an unfa-
miliar disease, having been a problem only during the past several years. 
Other evidence also suggests that the disease was not a tradition-
ally recognized problem in taro cultivation. Out of information gathered 
(in 1973) fi-om 11· census districts on Bougainville-Buka, the almost unan-
imous view of the villagers was that the blight was a recent introduction, 
the vast majority claiming it was unknown befor~ the war. They usually 
have no special name for the disease, merely referring to it as "dry leaf" 
or "rotten leaf" in their respective tongues. This is significant be-
cause they recognize and name all other important taro diseases and 
pests, and state that all were present before the war. 
The fact that the disease has only recently spread to other areas 
in the Pacific suggests that it.is also a recent arrival to Bougainville. 
If the disease had in fact been an early comer to the Pacific Islands, 
one would expect its distribution to rival at least partially that of 
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taro itself and of the numerous other species of t'lora which :n8.:1 has 
helped distribute throughout the region. 
The tropical plant -botanist, J. W. Purseglove, has noted that many 
tropical crops are more successf'..l.2.ly gro'r.'11 in areas "far re:::oyed from 
the regions in which they originated.,,31 The princi.pal reason for this, 
states Pursegl07e, is that in the new areas the crops are illlaffected 
by the "the major diseases and pests -.. hieh attack them at their centre 
of origin. ,,32 Botanists believe that taro originated far to the west, 
in either South or Southeast Asia. Thus, until the int:C'oduction of 
Phytophthora coZocasiae, taro in the Pacific Islands seems to haye oeen 
relatively free of serious plant diseases ,33 
The evidence suggests, then, that the disease was introduced to the 
Northern Solomons around the time of World War II. The main source of 
disagreement is whether it was introduced shortly before the war or du-
ring the war. Accepting the claim of the Catholic Missionaries and 
other Europeans, the agronomist, George Harvey, wrote in 1947, "It is 
true that the disease was present oefore the war but its actual distri-
bution can not be .~hecked as yet for it is just hearSay.1I34 
If the disease was introduced before the war; there is reason to 
believe that its distribution must have been limited. Prof. Douglas L. 
Oliver conducted anthropological research in Siwai during 1938 and 1939. 
He made extensive observations on the cultivation of taro and emphasized·f 
its great importance in Siwai society.35 Yet he m~de no mention of &~y 
serious taro disease, nor does he now recollect that such a disease was 
36 then present. Rev. A. H. Voyce, a r·1ethodist missionary in the Siwai-
Buin area from 1926 to 1958 (with the exception. of the wartime years), 
If 
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states that he saw nothing of the taro disease before the war. He had 
always assumed that the disease was a Japanese wartime introduction. 
His observations are worthy of note because he was an avid gardener 
while on Bougainville, and continues to raise taro and other tropical 
and sub-tropical crops at his home on New Zealand's North Island. 37 
The only indigenous people interviewed who stated that the blight 
was present before the war, were several residents of the villages of 
Gagan and Lemanmanu on Buka. At Gagan, a Catholic catechist asserted 
that the blight had arrived in 1941 but was unknown before that time. 38 
At- Lemanmanu two informants, in separate interviews, said the blight 
was present before the war but was not yet serious (em i no ken mekim 
nogut). One of the informants, a very elderly man, first stated that 
the blight was present shortly before the war but admitted that it was 
not then very serious. He went on to explain that it was only after the 
Japanese left that the blight became a serious problem, implying that in 
some way the Japanese were to blame, but not being able to explain 
exactly how. 39 
The above reports indicate that the blight was probably present in 
scattered locations throughout Bougainville-Buka s:1ortly before the war. 
It is unfortunate that no prewar written reports of the blight were 
found. But the verbal recollections recorded immediately after the war, 
together with those recorded during 1973, cannot be ignored. It is un-
likely that the missionaries, and others who affirm the prewar intro-
duction of the blight, would have mistakenly assigned the arrival date 
so near to the outbreak of the war. They would more likely have claimed 
that the blight had long been present or quite logically, that it had 
been imported during the war. 
~.', 
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If there were 110 repcrts of the bligh-:' s presence be::"ore the ' ..... ar, 
it would be very te:npting to assign the blame to the Jap8.Ilese (as in 
fact, many people have). After all, many living organisms are known to 
have been accidentally spread about the world as a result of the massive 
wartime r:1ovements of men and supplies, not to mention the purposeful 
introductions. The Japa.'1ese introduced African s1:ails to New Britain 
and :::lany other islands as a source of food. 40 They also introduced many 
food crops to the areas they occupied. To Bougainville they brought 
squash, eggplant, cabbages, a..'1d new varieties of sweet potato. 41 But on 
Bougainville andBuka no evidence of introduced taro could be found, 
except that which was introduced postwar in an effort to restock indig-
enous gardens. All reports from Bougainville-Bt~a indicate that the 
Japanese grew only local varieties of taro. Only from the Shortlands is 
there a report of Japanese introduced taro. An early 1949 Touring 
Report from the Short lands reports that the "chiefs" attribute the taro 
disease to the importation of' a Japanese variety of taro with many 
tubers. The report states, "It is significant that the disease has been 
most virulent in :P.'.lin, Short lands , and Northern Choiseu.l, all areas of 
Japanese -occupation. On this supposition [the],strange variety [was] 
eradicated by [the] natives.,,42 
In the absence of corroborating evidence,the Shortlands report 
can not be relied upon, no matter how attractive such an interpretation ,\ 
appears to be. The most that can be said is that the blight was prob-
ably introduced by a non-indigenous person having access to pla.'1ting 
material from some infected area of Asia or Southeast Asia. Based on 
the earliest reports, the introduction was probably made into Bougain-
ville one or two years before the Japanese invasion of ~arly 1942. 
.. 
The severity of the taro blight in terms of maxjmum possible in-
tensity and variability will now be, considered. The disease's severity 
is directly related to the presence of certain optimal environmental 
condi tions. The main factor in the disease "s considerable destructive 
potential is the phenomenal production and germination of large numbers 
of spores in relatively short periods of time. But in order to produce 
such large numbers of spores and to have them germinate at their maximum 
rate, ideal environment'al conditions are necessary. The actual gro"Wth 
of'the fungus within the plant can occur over a wider range of environ-
mental conditions. 
Trujillo has found that maximum spore production occurs at 21°C 
(69.8°F) and 100% relative humidity.43 Figures 2 and 3 show how sharply 
spore production varies with temperature and relative humidity, respec-
tively. Spore germination occurs only in free water, i.e., there must 
be at least one droplet of water on a leaf before germination can take 
place. The optimum water temperature range for spore germination is 
20-210 C (68-69',8°F), although germination does take place from 20-24°C 
(68-75.2°). Trujillo found that if water temperature increased to 28°c 
, ° ° ° ' (82.4 F) 'or dropped to 16 C (60.8 F), no germination occured. Thus if 
the temperature remains around 20-21oC (68-69.8°F), with the relative 
humidity at 100% and given the presence of water cxoplets from dew or 
rain, conditions are ideal for the rapid spread of the blight fungus. 
Once the leaves are infected, the fUngus grows best at 28°c 
(82.4°F), but continues to grow up to 34°C (93.2oF). The most likely 
sequence, then, is for the fungus to spread during the night and early 
morning hours when temperatures are low and humidities are high, ~~d 
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for the lesi~ns to grow during the day when temperatures rise. In 
Hawaii) Trujillo observed that: 
Epidemics of the disease occurred in the field when the 
night temperature and relative humidity were optimum for 
6-8 hours for 3 to 4 consecutiKt days and light rains or 
dews prevailed in the morning. 
Now that the ideal conditions for the blight's spread have been 
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discussed, it is appropriate to ask where on Bougainville-Buka are such 
blight favoring conditions most likely to occur? Climatic records 
should provide a clue but there are some problems. The above data on 
optimal environmental conditions were derived from precisely regulated 
laboratory experiments. On the other hand, the climatic data from 
Bougainville were undoubtedly obtained from instruments much less ac-
curate than those of a research laboratory. The st~~dard meteorological 
shelters normally used to house the recording instruments, were designed 
primarily for temperate zones, and are therefore often responsible for 
t t d 1 t " h "'"~ d 45 I dd"t" "t erroneous empera ure an re a ~ve um~Qluy reCOT s. n a l ~on, ~ 
is known that standard hygrographs used to record relative humidity give 
incorrect readings as the relative humidity approaches ~OO%.46 Another 
problem is that records are of different durations for different stations 
and do not necessarily cover the same years. Nevertheless, several char-
acteristics are immediately discernible. From the mean monthly rainfall 
data shown in Figure 4 and the mean monthly relative humidity (at 9:00 
A.M.) figures shown in Figure 6, it is apparent that, excluding mountain-
ous areas) the southern-most sections of Bougainville are the wettest 
and most humid. As shown in Figure 5, the mean minimum monthly tempera-
tures are also lowest in Southern Bougainville. An important reason for 
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these lower minimum temperatures is the effect of cold air drainage 
down the slopes of the relatively high mountains. 
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Figure 7 shows that in 1969, Aropa received from 1 to.3~ hours 
more average daily sunshine than Buin did over the same period. It is 
quite probable that longer term records would also show that the Buin 
area receives significantly less sunshine than Aropa and most other 
low-lying areas to the north of Aropa. This excessively high cloud 
coyer undoubtedly influences the higher humidity and lower daytime tem-
peratures recorded in the Buin region. 
Thus the available data shows that throughout the southern..,.most 
low-lying sections of Bougainville, weather conditions approaching those 
most suitable for severe outbreaks of the blight are apt to occur more 
frequently than elsewhere on Bougainville-Buka. There are several 
reasons for this. The most important factors influencing the climate 
of the two islands are the seasonal winds and the regional topography. 
Between December and April, the northwest winds dominate and rainfall 
is abundant in almost all areas. From May through November the south-
east tradewinds prevail. But during this season heavy rains fall mostly 
on the southern part of Bougainville while Buka and Northern Bougain-
ville experience a sharp decrease in rainfall. This decrease is due to 
the rain shadow effect of the southern mountains. The moist tradewinds 
are forced up the mountain slopes, causing heavy rainfall on the wind-
ward side but resulting in only light precipitation in the leeward 
areas. 
In Southern Bougainville the May through November tradewind season 
results in the coincidence of several blight-favoring climatic condi-
tions. The highest mean monthly precipitation, the highest mean monthly 
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relative humidity, and the lowest mean minL~~~ monthly temperatures 
occur simultaneously. In Northern Bougainville and Buka the lowest 
mean minimum temperatures occur out of phase with higher humidity and 
rainfall. 
In discussing the occurrence of blight-favoring conditions through-
out Bougainville-Buka, the existence of microclimates should be noted. 
The microclimate near the leaves of taro plants about three feet above 
the ground in a taro garden is different from the climate recorded in 
a standard meteorological shelter five to six feet above clipped turf. 
It is kno;.m that temperatures nearer the ground are higher during the 
, 47 day and lower during the night than those normally recorded. The 
temperatures of leaves of plants near the ground are in between the 
48 ground temperature and the air temperature. Generally, leaf tenper-
atures at night are lower than air temperatures while during the day 
they are higher. 49 The relative humidity close to the foliage of pl&~ts 
is increased due to the plant's transpiration. 50 Also, if the macro-
climate (large-scale climate) is a wet one or if the plant foliage for::ns 
a canopy over the ground, the relative humidity increases as the ground 
51 is approached. 
The importance of this information on microclimates near the ground 
lies in what is predicted about the actual conditions in a Bougainville 
taro garden. If macroclimate records are consulted, they show other 
than optimur~ temperature and humidity conditions for serious blight 
damage, even in Southern Bougainville. For example, Figure 5 shows that 
even during the coolest months the mean minim~~ temperatures are abatis 
three degrees above the optimum. But if it is probable that actual leaf 
.. ' 
temperatures in a taro garden ru:'e likely "to be lower than the macro-
climate readings~ then it is safe to concl'-lde that bligh"t-favorinc 
temperatures occur quite frequently. By the s~e token, one can assume 
that (as shown in Figure 6) i:' 9:00 A.M. ma~roclimate relative hurnidity 
records show readings of 85% ~ld above, the nighttime relative h~idity 
in a taro garden must often approach 100%. 
Thus far the nountainous areas o:~ 30ugainville have not been dis-
cussed with regard to the occ~rence of blight-favoring conditions. 
Since there are no climatic records available for the higher elevations 
on Bougainville, estimates and extrapolations must be reli.ed upon. It 
can be assumed that mean temperatures are 3.5°p lower for each 1000 feet 
. . 1 t" 52 r~se ~n e eva lon . Par example, the mo~~tain villages of Kuritave 
and Damung in the Kongara Census Division are situated above the 2,000 
feet level. Using nearby Kieta' s mean temperature as a base, these 
villages could be expected to have a mean atlIlual maximum temperature 
of 79.8°p and a mean annual minimum of 68°F. With regard to rainfall, 
. the only thing which can be said is that it generally increases with 
elevation. But with the heavier rainfall, the mean relative humidity 
would also be expected to increase. Thus in the mountains~ the rela-
tive humidity 'W'oUld probably be close to the optimum for the blight's 
spread. Temperature, then, would be the limiting factor, especially 
when microclimatic conditions are taken into account. It is known 
that the temperatures near the ground in the mountains show even 
greater ;:iifferences from n:acroclirr.ate readings. 53 Therefore even in 
a taro garden at only 2000 feet, terr.peratures below optimum for the 
blight would be expected almost everJ night. 
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To summarize the foregoing, optimw~ conditions for severe blight 
damage are apt to occur· more frequently throughout the low-lying areas 
of Southern Bougainville than anywhere else on Bougainville-Buka. In 
the mountains, lower than optimum nighttime temperatures during the 
very hours of peak humidity woul~ be expected to limit the severity 
there. 
Now that the conditions most favorable to blight damage have been 
examined, specifio reports on the blight's severity can be better eval-
uated. There are many apparently conflicting reports concerning the 
blight's severity. Patrol officers sometimes reported Geeing large 
gardens of healthy young plants and therefore concluded that taro was 
making a comeback and the effects of the blight were diminishing. In 
fact, immature widely spaced plants rarely suffer extensive damage from 
the blight. It is when the leaves begin to form a denser c~~opy, thus 
increasing the surrounding humidity and retention of .Tater droplets on 
the leaves, that the blight becomes serious. 54 But even at this stage, 
if the weather happens to be relatively dry, the resulting damage al-
though significant, may be tolerable. In order to learn the true 
severity.of the blight in a given area, continual'observations are 
required covering the full range of climatic conditions which occur. 
In September of 1947, a patrol officer visiting villages in the 
Teop area was warned by the villagers against drawing hasty overly 
optimistic conclusions. He wrote: 
•..• A singularly striking feature of the gardens at Lumsis 
and Aravia, is the good healthy taro being grown at the 
moment. I enquired as to whether the disease that has 
struck taro on Bougainville was visible in the present 
crop. They said no, but intimated, that should rain fall 
soon, the wilt would set in. 55 
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There are othe::- -:;a;:;::-ol ::-eports clain:ing tha·t~ the taro crops have 
failed altogether. In early 1947 apatl"o2. report f::-om t:le Kono Census 
Division in the Buin area stated that, "As elsewhere taro has failed 
completely, and successive plantings have died long before r:J.aturity.1156 
A similar report came from the Hakunai a::-ea in 1952: 
'!'aro is grown in li.::li ted quantities, but h~re a120 the 
nati ves co!:!plain that. the crop ·oeg~:r..s to wi t:le.r at a 
certain state, and eventuall:'l dies altogethe~·. Thi3 
disease is corr..:rJ.on throw;;hC)'';'~ the Subdistrict. 57 
There is some quite reliable e'iidence to s'J.bstantiate the reports 
maintaining that the blight has resulted in the total destruction of 
large numbers of plants. Gordan ~nlson, the agricultural officer sent 
to Bougainville District in late 1946, had the job of searching for 
blight-tolerant varieties of taro. The agricultural station then 
located on the Buka side of Buka Pas sage, Itept an experimental plot of 
reportedly disease-tolerant taro varieties. At the end of March, 1951, 
Wilson filed the following report concerning the experimental plot: 
A small plot containing several [taro] varieties which 
have been grown here for several years as t~ey had pre-
viously shown some degree of tolerance toPhytophthora 
was completely destroyed by the disease during the latter 
part of the month. The plot was planted in Aug'J.st, 1950, 
and at the beginning of ~he month appeared to be in a very 
healthy state with little sign of d::'sease, but at the end 
of three weeks rain all foliage had been destroyed by the 
i'ungus. 58 
In some cases when all the foliage is destroyed, the corms are able 
to survive to put out new leaves. But since Wilson said the plot was 
·'completely dCD Lroyed II. i l can be nssulned that in this case the c()rm~~ 
did not survive. Such a claim is difficult fer some modern researchers 
to believe. For in Hawaii, where much of the research on Phytophthora 
• 
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aoZoaasiae has been conducted, observations have shown that only the 
foliage has been affected. Likewise at Dala Research Station, on 
Malaita in the British Solomons, researchers have never observed such 
lethal severity.59 The lack of such observations in these two areas 
undoubtedly reflects the lack of prevailing blight-favoring conditions. 
Underestimates of the disease's lethal potential began ,.i th the first 
scientific description and naming of the disease. In 1900, Raciborski, 
stated that on Java it was widely distributed but did not cause much 
60 damage to the plant. In 1913, Butler and Kulkarni reported contrary 
findings from India: 
Raciborski's statement that it causes little damage is 
too sweeping. Sometimes, in favourable ~eather for its 
development, the leaves are so rotted that the entire 
plant is killed. In 1909, during a period of almost 
continuous cloud and rain in August, a number of plants 
died from the disease at Pus~ and the growtb of the rest 
was brought to a standstill. bl 
BSIP agriculturalist, John Suckling, reported after an inspection 
of Short lands gardens in 1947, that the corms of diseased plants 
"quickly rot after destruction of the aerial parts. ,,62 Butler and 
Kulkarni fOIDld that when corms showed wet rot either in the field or 
during storage, Phytophthora aoZoaasiae could be dEtected in them along 
with secondary organisms. They concluded that without the invasion by 
secondary organisms a dry rot occurs as in the potato blight. 63 
Trujillo states that it is probably a combination of soil-born organisms 
including P. aoZocasiae which kills the plant after attacking it in its 
ak d . 't' 64 we ene cond~ ~on. 
Most of the doubts and controversy regarding the severity of the 
blight stem from a misunderstanding of its extreme dependence upon 
.... 
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specific environnenta1 conditions. Butler and Ku2i:arni wrote in 1913: 
Nothing is clearer tr.~~ the close connection between the 
intensity of the disease and the atmospheric canditions 
prevalent during the growth period of the host. Much the 
worst attack noticed at ?usa during i::he last six years 
occured in 1909, a :rear vrhen the rainfall was r.early double 
the normal, the.:::"e was almost contin~ous cloud or rain 
during August and SepteJ'!:be.:::", the total precipitation for 
t:lese two months was 28.44 inches a..~d the 8:CO A..M. rel-
ati ve humidity ex·:eec.ed 80 per cent on 53 out of 61 days. 65 
In 1925, Gomez reported that in the Philippines: 
.... the disease is se-rere a week after a continuous ra.in, 
owing, perhaps, to the spores [being] splashed by the rain 
from infected to healthy leaves. In the field it was 
noted that infection ·was severe during a few rainy days 
in AUg1Jst, 1924, and also after continuous rain in October, 
1924.66 
That the disease's most severe outbreaks occur during periods of 
continuous rain makes Phytophthol'a coZoaasiae very similar to 
Phytophthol'a infestans~ the cause of the Irish Potato Famine. Cecil 
Woodham-Smith wrote: 
In Ireland in 1846 conditions favoured the spread of the 
blight fungus to an extent which has not been recorded 
before or since .•.. The weather of 1846 was wet--'continual 
rain' yet warm .... 67 
Trujillo has stated that the optimum conditions for the two species 
are almost identic~ except that P. aoZocasiae requires slightly warmer 
68 temperatures. 
The history of the severity of the blight on Bougainville-B~~a will 
be discussed more fully in the next chapter. The importarlt point -:0 
note here is that blight-favoring conditions are frequently present in 
all low-lying areas or' Bougainville-Buka. But the southern-most region 
of Bougainville most consistently displays these favorable conditions. 
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If Butler anj Kulkarni's data on the environmental conditions in India 
which led to the worst blight in six years are compared with those ob-
taining every year in Southern Bougainville, the severity of the blight 
in this region can be better appreciated. Butler and Kulkarni con-
sidered a relative humidity of at least 80% at 8 A.~-1. on 53 out of 61 
days to be excessive. Figure 6 shows that the me~~ relative humidity 
at 9 A.M. at Buin is 80% or above for 11 out of 12 months of the year. 
Mitchell reports that at the 600 feet level in Nagovisi, n •••• during 
most of any given day the relative humidity is well above 90%, and 
usually above 95%. . .. these periods of high humidity are almost always 
during the night and afternoon hours.,,69 Butler and Kulkarni stated 
that the figure of 28.44 inches was well above the normal rainfall for 
the two months of August and September. Figure 4 shows that at Baku, 
such an amount is exceeded in almost any two-month period throughout 
the year. 
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CHAPrER III 
The Bougainvillians' Response to the :alight 
It is ass"'..lTI1ed that the t8.1"O blight was present on Bougainville-
Buka shortly before the war, but little is kno'NTI of i~s initial impact. 
Only towards the close of the war is there any record of the blight's 
effect on the lives of ",::;he indigenous people. But d.'.lring t~e period of 
re$ettlement and readjustme!lt immediately a:'ter the ·"ar, the ef:'ects of 
the war and those of the taro blight are very difficult to distinguish. 
Indeed, the people, themselves, have tended to·lump them together by 
blaming the failure of their taro on wartioe activiti'~s. To them, loss 
of their staple crop was yet another catastrophe ?.nlong the many trage-
dies which they had been forced to endure, through no fault of their 
The impact of the blight was delayed in many areas because of the 
absence of planting material for new gardens. In all areas where there 
had been Japanese troop concentrations, taro gardens were pillaged to 
the extent that almost no t8.2"O was left by the end of the war. Fred 
Archer, in his report of the first postwar patrol of Buka, 'Nrote in 
early 1946 that, "The Japanese ate both tubers and leaves of the taro, 
and so destroyed most of it."l Similarly Capt. Slattery had reported 
from Nagovisi in July, 1945: "There is no taro ... The Japanese destroyed 
even the stalks necessary for replanting.,,2 Many villagers in 1973 
remembered that the Japanese consumed even the "stik beZong taro" 
3 (taro stalks) leaving nothing to plant for the next crop. 
The Japanese resorted to this pillaging of indigenous gardens only 
after they had been cut off from their incoming supplies. Although no 
Japanese merchant ships arrived after January, 19444, captured Japanese 
records show that submarines constantly delivered limited amounts of 
r:: 
food until about August of 1944.~ Although still short of food, by this 
time the Japanese had embarked upon a well-plan~ed prcgyam cf self-
sufficiency. In July they began to rely on food produced in their own 
gardenS6 and by November this production was sustaining all the troops 
on Bougainvi.lle . 7 "During the latter half of 1944 approxinately 35 per 
cent of the Japanese force was on gardening and fishing duty ... The 
gardens grew sweet potatoes [the staple food], corn, egg fruit, beans, 
peanuts, and green vegetables. Pawpaws, bananas, coconuts and pine-
apples were plentiful. There were chickens in every units' lines."B 
The Japanese on Bougainville-B~~a probably would have waited out the 
war, contin~ing to support themselves by growing their own food, but 
after the Australians took over from the Americans (in October of 1944) 
they were forced to turn again to fighting. The Australian decision to 
take the offensive surprised the Japanese and, in the end, resulted not 
only in many Japanese and Australian casualties but in much additional 
hardship and suffE::ring for the indigenous people. The A.ustralian offen-
sive cauSed many more Bougainvillians to become refugees and forced the 
a Japanese to pillage indigenous gardens instead of tending to their own./ 
Many indigenous people had fled their villages before the Australian 
offensive. But this action increased their numbers and added to the 
numerous cases of malnutrition and starvation, which resulted from the 
hardships of living in the bush. lO At the close of the war, when these 
people resumed village life, their health was still in a poor state. In 
many areas (especially in the southwest and westcoast regions) AHGAU 
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supplied rations to neT.rly resettled villages untiJ their gardens T,ie:'e 
. d' 11 aga:m pro uc 1.ng . Undoubtedly these v:i.l::.agers were thus better able 
to regain their health while rebuilding their villages and gardens. 
In areas where taro planting 83,terial w·as scarce the people were 
forced to rely on s.reet potatoes. Planting material for sweet potatoes 
can be :::'Jltiplied much faster than Ca.;1. taro planting material. Sweet 
potato vines ca.'1 be divided into very short lengtr"s (1 foot or less) and 
simply pushed into the soil, so that a ... ~hole field can be planted up 
from just a few parent plants. On the other hand; ta=o can only be 
multipli.ed by wai ting for the side shoots to appear off of the main corm, 
which in moet varieties only takes p2.ace when the plant begins to reach 
maturity (from 6 months to a year or more). When taro planting material 
did finally become available to the villages without it, it was often 
found that the blight drastically reduced the yield, when not killing 
the plants outright. In these cases the patrol officers could only ad-
vise that all blight-infected plants be burned and that more sweet 
t t b 1 t d 12 po a oes e p an e . 
Villages which planted large areas of taro, not realizing the 
severity of the blight, probably experienced food shortages until they 
realized that substit"<.lte crops must be relied upon. No detailed records 
of such shortages were found but they undoubtedly occured until the 
people witnessed the full destructive nature of the. blight. 
It seems that due to the availability of both government rations 
and a quick-maturing (2 to 4 months) alternative crop like sweet potato, 
the most signii'ic:J..l1t. immediate effects of the blight were widespread 
feelings of disappointment and discouragement. The 1973 interviews were 
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not very successful in getting the villagers to articulate what their 
feelings had been when they first realized that taro could no longer be 
their staple food. l3 Perhaps they had so long ago become resigned to 
this fate that they had put aside their initial disappointment. Never-
theless there is strong evidence of their initial profound sense of loss. 
Fred Archer, i~ the first postwar patrol report from Buka, wrote: 
The absence of the taro is a severe blow to the natives 
and they feel it .•. The inportance of taro to these 
natives cannot be too strongly stressed. Tney state 
that without it they have not the s~e strength or 
resistance to disease as formerly.14 
During the controversy resulting from Msgr. Hannan's allegations 
regarding an excessively high death-rate on Bougainville, Bishop Wade 
stated that in his. view, the "psychological effects" due to the loss of 
taro had been so serious that they were in part responsible for the 
higher death-rate. l5 The significant point here is not whether 
"psychological" factors actually influenced the death-rate, but the 
fact that a sincere witness like Bishop Wade made such an appraisal re-
garding the seriousness of the loss 0:( taro. Fred Archer's assessment 
of the situation is also worthy of note. W. J. (Jack) Read of coast-
watcher fame, wrote in a foreword attached to Archer's above-quoted 
patrol report, "Lieut. Archer's twenty years of intimate knowledge of 
Buka ensures reliance on his comments." 
After a December, 1946 patrol to the Mamaramino area of Buin, ADO 
R. R. Cole wrote: "There appears to be a general apathy present in 
the area and considering the reasons, the outlook r~3.!l be e.ppreciated 
16 
o.lthough not encouraged." He added that the lack of taro was an im-
port ant factor in·these feelings of disillusionme~t and helplessness. 
Assista"'1t D:Lstric~, Cffice~ ~ J. ? ~tJni -:e, co~enting on the sig!1i.~--'iC,'J.,~ce 
of taro to the Jasioi people in 1947, wrote: "'1'he r~-establish.J.;:ent of 
this staple on a sound basis, free from the da..'1ger of decimation by 
disease, is of outstanding ~c::::?Or~a:1c-:: :':tom the psycnological as • .-ell 
th t · . . 1 T d . . ,,17 as e!lU rl t.l.ona s ,",ar~ POlY::: " ITI1e ~elat:'-.:.-e nutritional merits of 
taro will be consid.er~:i later. but j,,";'1:" te I s contention that the loss of' 
taro was a serious blow to tl:e Easic,i ;:eople, lS sim.ilar to r'2~orts 
from throughout Eougaimrille-3u}:a. In Septembe::- of 1947, Patrol Officer, 
J. M. Robinscn ',G'cte that in the Pariro area of 3uin, va:'ieties of 
Xanthosoma were being successfully grown, but added, "The absence of 
'8 true taro is still felt by tIle natives, 11.l. Kevin TorrJ..in, an agricul-
tural. officer, '..rho was stationed on Bcugainville for many years, '..rrote 
the following (in 19(4) regarding his recollections of the i:n:pact of the 
taro blight on the Bougainville peo;:le: 
To Bougainvillians the disease was a national d.is3.ster 
since the impact was so general B..'1d happened over a 7ery 
short length of time. In August 1953 when I firs~ arrived 
there t people I contacted over the whole island were be-
moaning the loss of their taro and having to eat what "':11ey 
l'egarded as I ;:ig food' --s~.,eet pota"to. They had to ma...1{e 
the change quickly and the step from taro to Kaukau to them 
was the equivalen"t of A:rr.ericans haYing to live on ice 
blocks instead of ice cream. 19 
In reports from several areas there were references to the people 
feeling weakened due to the lack of taro. Patrol Officer A. J. 
Humphries, in January of :9 47. W":'ote concerning the inhabitaJlts of what ,\ 
is now the Kono Census Di yision of the Buin Suo Di.strict: lilt is con-
sidered that their diet at present is insufficient. A solid diet of 
kaukau makes them look healthy, but there is little or no stamina. ,,20 
In the same month, C. Tri. Slattery, in a patrol report concerning the 
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people of the Teopasino area, stated: "As in Buka Island, the lac:{. of 
their staple food, taro, is reflected in the 'softness' and reduced 
21 powers of endurance of many of the men-folk." These reports are cited 
to show the considerable importance attributed to taro as a strength-
giving food. It is quite uI11ikely that there was any very serious 
nutrition-related loss of strength. The point is that the people be-
lieved in this idea so strongly that they convinced the patrol officers 
that it was true. 
Around the close of the war the people of Bougainville-Buka were 
faced with the problem of re-establishing their traditional subsistence 
gardening. As mentioned, there was a widespread shortage of planting 
material, not only for taro but for other crops. Where the largest 
Japanese troop concentrations had been located there were large well-
prepared gardens, which were producing sweet potatoes ~~d some other 
vegetables. 22 On Buka and undoubtedly in the Buin-Siwai area as well, 
the people were able to live off of these gardens until they had tin:.e 
to bring their own into production. The sweet potatoes found in the 
Japanese gardens were mainly Japanese varieties imported from Japan. 
Today the peoplz still grow such varieties as tri mun (it matures in 
3 months), tokio, and t~Janko, all of which mature more quickly than 
local varieties (probably because they were necessarily summer crops in 
Japan). The ready availability of planting material from these early 
yielding Japanese varieties made them an ideal substitute crop to be 
relied upon until taro could once again be produced. Certainly in the 
beginning the majority of people saw sweet potato as only a temporary 
~;ub~,tiLute crop. Fred Archer wrote in ea.rly 1946 that the people of' 
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Buka "do not favour kaukCI'')' (sweet potato) as a staple article of diet," 
but "realize that until they once more get taro 'tops' to plant, that 
kaukau will be their main c:::-op."23 The Assistant Dist:::-ict Officer for 
.the Kieta Sub-Dist:::-ict, in an Aug'~st,' 1946 monthly report stated: 
the absence of taro, the natives have developed gardens based upon sweet 
potato, ';1hich they feel to be inferior to taro, the lack of , ... hicl: dom-
inates their thinking on . ,-1- 1 +t lJ24 agr~c~vura ~a~ ers. In Siwai and Buin, 
especially, sweet potato was cornnonly considered mainly as "kaika:~ 
biZong pik" (pig food). 25 
Despite the widespread lmpopularity of sweet potato its use was 
encouraged by the missions, the patrol officers, and even the Principal 
Medical Off:.cer. Rev. A. H. "'loyce, a Methodist missionary who returned 
to Siwai after the war, and Father Kirk Clemens, ~tationed at Kunua 
immediately after the war, both stated that they and other missionaries 
enGouraged the substitution of sweet potato for taro as the staple 
crop.25 Patrol officers also often encouraged the planting of sweet 
potatoes. 27 Fred Archer reported that, after the war, the Administra-
tion people "told the natives that kaukau had everything that was needed 
to buoy them up an1 provide the needed strength." Archer stated that 
this idea was pushed by Dr. John T. Gunther, then the Principal Medical 
Officer, but "no one belie,-ed him. II The indigenous people, in Archer's 
opinion, saw this as yet "another white man's device to kid them 
28 
along." Even Gordan Wilson, the agricultural officer 'who was supposed 
to be working on the problem of how taro could be re-established was 
apparently a disciple of Dr. Gunther. In a 1949 monthly report con-
cerning Buka he wrote: 
•.. it would appear that the sweet potato is now generally 
accepted by the natives as the staple ... and as medical 
evidence in a comparison of food values favours the sweet 
potato slightly the change cannot be condemned from a 
purely material viewpoint. 29 
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In spite of the fact that sweet potato was not a preferred food, 
the people of Bougainville-Buka had agreed that under the circumstances 
obtaining immediately after the close of the war, it was the best choice 
for a temporary substitute. 
Before considering the attempts made by the indigenous people to 
cope with the blight, it is important to understand how they interpreted 
and explained what had happened to their taro. Since the causal organ-
isms of most plant diseases are difficult to detect with the naked eye, 
such diseases have throughout history (until recent times) been errO-
neously explair.ed in a variety of ways, often times relying upon the 
supernatural. Thus it is not surprising that the people of Bougainville-
Buka did not initially and in fact still do not understand the actual 
cause of the taro blight. Their explanations are generally spealdng, 
quite logical and no less far-fetched than those given by other peoples 
under similar circtunstances. For instance, many people in Western Samoa 
have attributed the introduction of the bunchy top disease of bananas 
to Gary Coop.=r, who apparently in some wa:'.{ displeased the Samoans while 
in Samoa making the film, Return to Paradise. 30 In the Marshall Isl&~ds, 
the people have assigned the cause of breadfruit diseases to ~~ssile 
testing by the U. S. Government. 31 
As previously mentioned, in 1973 the most widespread explanation 
for the failure of taro on Bougainville-Buka was that the wartime bomb-
ing had somehow spoiled the ground. The unprecedented bombing and 
/I.'" 
strafing of villages and gazodcr:.s d'.lrir:g -:'l:e wa:- Dust h3."J"e had a terri-
fying effect upon the populace. Ogn.n ::.'epor:'s that the .,Ulied ~onbing 
of the Kieta area, "thorough.ly denoralized" the Nasioi people of Aropa 
Valley.32 The bombin8 ..... 1as :.L.i.doub:edly the .::lost extraordinary and 
devastating aspect of the war, so it iS1..l.."1de:::-standable that the people 
might attribute to it mere da.":lage thar: ,,;as ac:'ua2.ly caused. There are 
ma...'1Y variations of the bombi::,g e:"''Pla.''latio!i.. Among them is the idea that 
not only did aircraft d!"op explcsi ve and incendiary bombs on vi::".lages 
and gardens, but spraying of ga!"dens (as houses are sprayed with DDT in 
anti-malarial campaigns) also occurred. During December 1945 and 
January, 1946, when Fred Archer conducted the first patrol of Buka after 
the war, he waG told that Allied pla..'1es had sprayed gardens, causing the 
taro plants to die. 33 
Among the very few early records of how the indigenous people 
explained the decline of their taro is a 1950 patrol report from Keria":.a. 
Patrol Officer J. R. Landman recorded that the people could offer no 
explanation, "except for a vague suspicion that bombing or the Japanese 
. 'bl .a4 were ~n some way respons~ e.' A 1948 patrol report from the 8ailo-
Teop area stated that concerning the taro decline ~ "the natives could 
give no explanation but assumed that the Japanese ·"ere responsible. ,,35 
In 1960, AgricultUral Officer G. E. Haling, in discussing the explanation 
for the blight in Buin, wrote: "A popular native concept of its [the .t 
taro blight's] origin is that it was introduced by the Japanese warti~e 
t . ,,36 occupa ~on. From the Banoni area in 1956 comes &~other variation of 
the bombing explanation with something new added. Patrol Officer D. J. 
Hook, after noting the continuing failure of taro plantings, wrote: 
" •.. the natives blame the exhaust from planes during the war and also 
a small weed which they say the Japanese introduced.,,37 
Kevin Tomlin, who was posted to Bougainville as an agricultural 
officer in 1953, remembers that concerning the explanations of the 
blight, "The Japanese were blamed for its introduction in areas not 
previously affected." Tomlin adds, "In other areas the popular (even 
if erroneous) belief was that during the night ash from the volcanoes 
('sit biZong paia') settled on the leaf and burnt holes ... ,,38 This 
interesting explanation is the only one which is wholly natural, that 
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is, not resul"t?ing from any actions of humans. There were as well some 
obviously supernatural explanations. Fred Archer reports that many of 
the inhabitants of:·Buka believed the blight to be some kind of divine 
retribution. Among the Buka people, Archer states, "the heathens ... 
were sure that the Old Gods were wroth and the Christian element con-
ceded that the Lord had smitten them for their lack of faith in the 
Gospel!,,39 Archer is basing this account on his recollections of the 
early postwar period. His recollections however tend to be substan-
tiated by interviews with the Buka people in 1973. Residents of Gagan 
village, while admitting that the blight was present a couple of years 
before the Japanese invasion, oelieve that its effects were worsened 
because they had Ill,ade offerings of taro to the "KAMISAMA" or "haus Zotu n 
set up by the Japanese for ancestor worship. Offerings to these shrines 
containing the bones of the tumbuna (ancestors) were seen as acts which 
went against the "trull God, thu5 the blight. 40 The residents of Gagan 
also mentioned that they believed that the Japanese practice of using 
human excrement as manure in the gardens introduced a small snek (worm) 
.. 
which also had. helpeti to spoil thei::- ta.:ro. It was plain that th:'s 
hl practice had been thoroughly revol-:ing to the Gagan people .. 
In interviews (in 1973) with people f::-om 27 villages in 10 census 
divisions (See Appendix A), almost all ex-planations for the blight 
involved SO!:le form of "medisen" being applied or left behind, purposely 
or accidentally, during the war. In addition, it is widely believed, 
that to make matters worse, weeds were purposely released from Allied 
aircraft to choke out gardens. not surprisingly, people in neighboring 
villages tended to have the same point of vie',; with ::-egard to the tru"O 
blight and its cause. 
In the Nasioi speaking areas of Kongara, Aropa Valley, and Kieta, 
the common view was that the bombing had been responsible for the 
fa;l.lure of their taro. Some informants merely indicated that it had 
been the bombing, without giving any further explanation. Others said 
that the blight had been caused by "medisen bileng bern". Several men-
tioned seeing a white powder on the leaves of plants after bombing had 
taken place and interpreted the ash-like powder to be some kind of 
. 4~ 
poison which eventUally resulted in the "sik biZong t<Z!'o." "- Most 
people used the Pidgin word bern but some used the word sprei or spray. 
The word spr~i is familiar to many Pidgin speakers because of frequent 
postwar spraying with DDT in anti-malarial campaigns. Nearly all the 
people were sure that gardens ",ad been purposely bombed or sprayed J 
during the war. But when the people of ~0urepera Village, located on 
the beach near Kieta, were asked why the mountain people grew more taro 
than they did, an explanation unrelated to the war was offered. They 
replied, "Graun, i koZd long maW/ten na taro i kcorrpap gut." (The ground 
in the mountains is cold and taro grows well there.)43 
<. 
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At Konga and its neighbo!"ing vil2..a.ges i.e Siwai, the standard ex-
pla.."1ation for the loss of taro was: "Medi.;en biZong hem i mek.im nogut 
graun." Some people left out the term bomb, sayi:.g only that airplanes 
had du.."llped "medisen" onto Japanese gardens to kill the crops and this 
had resulted in the "sil<. biZong tal'O, " One man, apparently a tY})e of 
original thinker, had a slightly d.i!ferent e:z..-planation. He maintained 
that such things ·as petrol and diesel oil had drained into the grour:.'i 
during the ",{ar (probably because C)!~ all the vehicles which we::=-e brought 
in) and had caused so much co.etamination that taru would no longer 
44 grow. Another man said that bombs had spilled "medisen" onto the 
ground and it had soaked in; resulting i.n spoiled taro. He went on to 
explain that this had been especially serious in the Siwai exea, where 
the ground was so level. In the mountains, he said, there were plenty 
of streams and ditches so that the medisen could drain out, but in 
Siwai it had remained in the grotmd. 45 Hany of the Siwai people inter-
yiewed said that taro. still grows in the mountains because fewer bombs 
were dropped there--most of the fighting had been in the leyel areas of 
Siwai. 
The Buin people interYiewed, from some of the villages near the 
town of Buin, gave explanations very similar to their neighbors in Siwai. 
Most people thought medisen from bombs had been responsible for spoil-
ing their taro. One woman believed the Japanese had left behind some 
,\ 
d · h' h 46 . b' h me 1-sen w ~c was to blame. A man from Aku Vlllage elleved t at 
allied spraying for mosquitoes had ruined the taro. 47 Several older ~en 
in Pariro Village stated emphatically that t~ey had no~iced that the 
leaves of their taro began to die immediately after allied planes began 
ao 
attacking the Japanese based in Buln--~mpL·ic.:!.l proof of tl·:e ca:.lse 0:· 
the taro blight in their opinion. The Buin people also stated that t~o 
can still be grow-n in the mountains because there had been less fi;:;hti.::z, 
and bombing there. 
In the Teop area, bombing and f1'o:a tl-:c '.far 
the 
40 prevalent explanations for the tal··':; blight. ~ ~vll.en asked why 
now grows better in the moc:ntains, ::esidents of Ro.rie (a EOlL'1tain 
village) replied that in the :l!ountains they have sno (feg or ~.ist~; 
be 
t~c 
which makes it cold. They said that ncar the beach it ',;as too hot for 
50 taro. 
Villagers, interviewed from Halia speaking areas disagreed on the 
cause of the taro blight. At Siara, on the east coast of Bougainv:l:"e's 
northern-most peninsula, the opinion was that medisen from the ',.;ar had 
spoiled their taro. 51 In Ieta village on Bu}:a Passage, sioila.rly the 
explanation was that medisen from wartime bombing had spoiled the 
d f t . 52 groun or aro growlng. But at Hana..'J.an I, some people s ai d the 
blight had been caused by smoke from the war. Others said that the 
blight was :3. "sik bilong Japar.," the Japanese had brought it, to Buka. 
One man thought the blight might have been present. before the war but 
did not know how it came. 53 At Lemanmanu, at the northern end of Buka; 
those interviewed said the blight a.rri ved before the war, but did !"lot 
know its origin. One very old man said it was present before the war, ,\ 
but became much :nore serious after the war. 54 
The idea that "medisen" had been sprayed into the gardens duril:e 
the war is doubted by many Europeans today. But the truth is that al-
though such spraying of gardens was not responsible fol' the "taro blight, 
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spraying did in fact occur. Robert Sherrod, in his book, History of 
Marine Corps Aviation in World War II (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 
1952), p. 210, after describing the March, 1944 Japanese attack on 
Torokina, wrote: 
General Hyakutake had lost 5,469 of his troops in the 
atta~k on the perimeter, against 263 of Griswold's 
soldiers. He pl~~ned another offensive for May, but 
he had to put his hungry soldiers to growing food 
after the rice ration fell from 700 grams daily 
(before the Torokina landing) to 250 grams in April 
to nothing in September. Strike Command was ordered 
to help along this food shortage by 'potato runs'. 
Altogether, 2,500 gallons of Diesel oil were dropped 
on the Jal'anese vegetable gardens, but the success 
of the experiment was doubted, even by the TBF pilots 
who sprayed the oil. 55 
Reportedly the oil was dropped only on Japanese gardens, but the 
pilots could not be relied upon to distinguish Japanese gardens from 
those of the indigenous people. After a reconnaissance flight over 
~ougainville, Capt. R. G. Ormsby of ANGAU wrote on August 2,1944: 
"Many Jap gardens were noticed. They are easily distinguished from 
native gardens by the manner in which they are laid out. This point 
is constantly being explained to intelligence officers for use in 
briefing pilots. ,,56 The implication is that the pilots needed to be 
convinced that they should dist,inguish between Japanese and indigenous 
gardens. Sherrod reported that American pilots, especially new ar-
rivals, tended to think of everything behind enemy lines as a ready 
target, ignoring the fact that "the country on the other side was 
friendly, too, except in spots controlled by the enemy.,,57 Therefore, 
it is very likely that many indigenous gardens wer~ sprayed along with 
those of the Japanese. 
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It is interesting to note how the peor;le responded when c..s}:ed -rlihy 
sweet potato had not been spoiled by the bombing and spraying. In 
nearly every case ,.;hen this question was asked, the answer was something 
like: "Kaukau J em i. rap nating, 11 sweet potato is only a vine. In Siwai 
the most interesting explanation -... -as given. On se'reral occasions Siwai 
people said that sweet potato could...'1 't feel the medisen because it was 
only a vine like a.'1',/ common vine growing in the bush. One Siwai man 
said that sw-eet potato was only a :{'op (vine) while taro was a ditJai 
(tree or shrub). Another said that taro was like a man, it could feel 
sick, but sweet potato was only a vine. 58 At Buin, some residents of 
Mamaromino Village said that sweet potato wasn't ruined by the bombing 
because it grows like a wild bush vine, you can even throw it away (or 
discard it) and it still begins growing again. 59 These explanations 
provide some indication of the relative value placed on the successful 
growing and consuming of taro versus sweet potato. 
Up until around the time of World War II, the people of Bougain-
ville-Buka had relied on taro as their staple food, just as their 
ancestors had, ger.eration upon generation. Then something from the 
war, some foreign substance or medisen, was intro'duced which caused the 
leaves of their taro to wither and die, either killing the plant al-
together, or resulting in an insufficient amount of food. Their 
explanations for the taro failure have been considered. Now the ques-
tion arises, how did the people act to try to cope with the new 
situation? 
After the war, once the people had gotten their gardens replanted 
and hud realized that their taro could no longer be relied upon, they 
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began to search for ways to remedy the problem. Their attempts can be 
divided into four categories: (1) use of garden magic and traditional 
medisen (2) requests for government assistance (3) relocation of gardens 
to higher ground (4) continued testing in the hope that the blight would 
subside or that resistant varieties would be found. 
In many areas traditional garden magic was resorted to in attempts 
to "fight" the new "sik biZong taro." Growth magic was used as well as 
specific medisen(s) which had formerly been used to fight familiar taro 
diseases and pests. Most of the evidence revealing that traditional 
ceremonies were used to counteract the taro blight comes from interviews 
with villagers in 1973. There is however some contemporary evidence 
which tends to substantiate the findings of the interviews. From a May 
1948 patrol to the North Nasioi area, W. J. Kelly reported: 
During the patrol the word 'LUKANU' or 'DUKANU' was 
encountered when any enquiries were made regarding 
taro. Upon questioning it was found that Lukami 
was used in making garden magic, mainly confined to 
the propagation of taro. It consists of bark scrap-
ings from various trees and plants gathered by one 
particular ~an in the village. It can be used in 
two ways. One way was to place a small portion of 
the substance in with the taro shoot and cover both 
with soil. The other being to light a fire on the 
windward side of the garden area and to burn the bark 
scrapings in it, thus allowing the smoke to cover the 
whole area, thus reaching and affecting all plants."60 
Patrol Officer Kelly emphasized that the people were very concerned 
61 
with trying to re-establish taro but were not having much success. 
Interviews in 1973, with residents of the Kongara and South Nasioi 
Census Divisions,. revealed that.garden magic similar to that reported 
by Kelly was engaged in immediately after the war. Residents of Damung 
(Kongara) and Bakatong (South Nasioi) stated that a coconut shell was 
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filled with the bark and leaves o,:~ '/ario1~s plants tOGether ',ri tIl taro 
roots. The shell '.ras then stored in the hC::A.s.z~uk (coo}-;:house) and. in 
Bakatong the ingredients were sometimes sprin . l\.led on the taro plants. 
In both villages the purpose of this pr2paration r"ras to insure the 
healthy development of large COl'ms of taro. .tUthough mal'1Y gardeners 
used such preparations to :c'ight tlle taro blight. these attempts were 
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not successful. 
In Shrai, some info:::mants described various forms of garden magic 
(known as KUNA in the Siwai la...,guage) which were traditiona.lly used 
against other taro pests and diseases. They stated that some had been 
tried a.gainst the taro blight but they were fou."1d not to be strong 
enough! because the blight had been caused by a foreign medisen~ with 
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which their traditional medisen(s) simply could not cope. In the 
Buin area, people told of similar kinds of garden magic which had been 
used bef'ore the war. At Pariro Village people even mentioned the use 
of' a coconut shell filled with herbs a..'1d kept in the house to insure 
a good taro crop. They claimed however that they had had no chance to 
try their traditional medisen(s) against the taro blight because of its 
64 immediate severe devastation. On Buka a major traditional technique 
for fighting plant diseases '"as smoking or smokim. Certain plants 'were 
burned in the taro garden so that the smoke produced would come into 
contact with the taro leaves. Residents of' Hanahau I said that smoking .t 
was used against the blight but was not effective. 65 
Having failed to overcome the effects of the taro blight through 
traditional methods, some villagers began to inquire about government 
assistance. The Assistant District Officer for the Kieta Subdistrict, 
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J. P. White, an enthusiastic supporter of the idea that taro should be 
re-established, had informed the Nasioi people of agronomist George 
Harvey's assignment to work on a solution to the taro problem. White 
wrote in an Aug. 14, 1947 memorandum to the District Officer: "The 
proposed activities of the Agronomist are being explained and interest 
in these activities is develOping.,,66 Less than a year later, W. J. 
Kelly, in a North Nasioi Area Patrol Report, wrote: " ... the wilt is 
still in all the gardens and many enquiries were made regarding the 
progress towards the cure of this disease, the natives were informed 
that officers are still working on the solution •.. ,,67 In a Nay 25, 
1949 Patrol Report from the Koromira area, W. I. Westerman, similarly 
reported: "Many enquiries were received by the writer as to whether 
the taro pest problem has yet been solved. The natives were informed 
that every effort is being made to discover the cause of the 'wilt'. ,,68 
In a forwarding letter to the District Officer for Westerman's Patrol 
Report, ADO D. J.Parrish, stated: "The taro problem is identical with 
that prevailing almost throughout Bougainville and natives far and wide 
are eagerly awaiting the solution to the problem by the Agriculture 
Departmen-t.,,69 Unfortunately the solution was not forthcoming, but it 
took many years for the people to realize this fact. In a September, 
1952 Patrol Report ADO A. K. Jackson, noted the following query from the 
Lugakei area of Buin: "The natives have asked whether any form of spray 
is successful against the wilt and information and assistance in this 
matter from the Department of Agriculture would be appreciated. ,,70 But 
the Department of Agriculture did not respond and as shown earlier, the 
official view of that Department (in 1954) was that there was no reason 
why taro could not be superseded by other crops.ll 
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In certain areas in the western regions of BougainYille, people 
reportedly found their own "solution 11 to the taro blight. B. A. McLarty 
in an August 1949 Patrol Report from the Keriaka-Kunua-Hahon area stated: 
"It has been found that native ta.ro will grow '..rell on the higher slopes 
and this is one of the principal reasons for tee recent movement of many 
+h ,,72 of the Keriaka villages higher into_Joe range. Iu September of the 
following year Patrol Officer A. K. Jackson gave a similar account from 
the Kunua area: " ... throughout the area patrolled taro crops are still 
being affected by a blight. The people of Kiakara [village] claim that 
they have found a solution by establishing their gardens at higher 
altitudes. It appears that this has received some success and the in-
'73 formation was passed on to all other villages." I McLarty·1 s above-
mentioned report is the only known account of the actual migration of 
whole villages in response to the taro blight. It is quite likely that 
when possible, gardens were moved to higher elevations (as reported for 
Kiakara) in many areas because it has been and is still widely recog-
nized on Bougainvil1e (since the outbreak of the blight), that taro 
grows much better at higher altitudes. This fa~t was noted by T. J. 
Leabeater in a Patrol Report from the Sailo-Teop area in 1952.74 Also 
in 1952, but from the Banoni Census District, Patrol Officer J. E. 
Norton reported: 
Prior to the war taro was successfully grown throughout ,\ 
the Banoni division but since, most crops have failed ... 
Mom village alone has produced good crops, but there is 
no difference in their method [of cultivation] to those 
of other natives. Taro has largely replaced sweet potato 
as the staple ... nnd the taro hungry coastal natives enjoy 
turo honpitlLJ iLy durinp; visits to Mom. The nearby Kern.kopa 
village hus bOUl~ht. tubers from Morn and to date have reared 
them succcnnfnliy .15 
.. 
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By 1956, Kerakopa had succeeded in growing taro. D. J. Hook, in a May 
1956 Banoni Patrol Report stated that, "Hom and Kerakopa are the only 
villages that have taro as their staple. All other villages have sweet 
potato." He noted that this was so, even though taro was "still much 
ul f d · th' ,,76 more pop ar as a 00 ~n ~s area ..• Although not mentioned by 
either of the two patrol officers, the reason for the success of taro 
at Mom and Kerakopa is almost certainly their higher elevation relative 
to the coastal villages. 77 This explanation is backed up by Agricul-
tural Officer K. I. Tomlin's 1956 observations in the Banoni area. 
Tomlin reported that taro was "not grown to any extent at lower al-
titudes" because of the blight but that taro was grown "in the higher 
parts" where the incidence of the blight was "sporadic" and appeared 
"to vary with weather conditions.,,78 Tomlin had reported the previous 
year from Buin that taro could not be grown "except in isolated spots 
in the mounta.ins, 'presumably where sources of infection and temperature 
are much lower. ,,79 The above reports, based on firsthand observations, 
reveal that the severity of the blight was in fact limited by the lower 
temperatures of higher altitudes, as predicted by the scientific data 
presented in Chapter II. 
Thus, people throughout Bougainville discovered that taro could 
still be grown at higher elevations. But to those people with no access 
to higher ground, this discovery had little significance apart from con-
firming their explanation of the blight--the ground in the mountains hac' 
escaped most of the bombing because the war had been fought mainly in 
lOW-lying areas. In the low-lying areas taro was continually tested for 
many years in the hope that the blight would go away or that resistant 
.. 
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varieties would. be f01..L.'1d. In so:ne areas, these sustained ef:::~()rt3 led 
to at least partial success, but in others there have been no~hing but 
failures right up to the present. The people of the Buin and Siwai 
language groups began tryir.g to plant taro gardens as soon as planting 
material was available after the war. In southern ::e·ougainville and in 
all other areas where planting material was in short supply, people 
brought taro in from other areas. This undoubtedly helped spread the 
blight throughout Bougainville-Blika at a much faster rate. According to 
Patrol Reports, gardens in the low-lying areas of Buin-Siwai were so 
severely affected by the blight that even the first postwar crops failed. 
In late 1946, in the Kono 8.l"ea of Buin, it w-as reponed that taro had 
failed "completely" and "successive plantings" had Hdied long before 
maturity.,,8D Two years later, ADO D. J. Parrish wrote that the people 
c:f the Paubakei area, "after many attempts at replanting taro •.. ha're 
finally given up the idea of this crop ever making good again for some 
time to come.,,8l But even in 1950 many people were still trying. 
R. R. Cole noted in an October 1950 Patrel Report from the Kono area: 
"Although repeated attempts have been made and :u-e still being made to 
re-establish the native taro, efforts to date have met with no success.,,82 
Patrol Of:ficer B. B. Butcher, in April 1951, noted that in the Lugakei 
area people, "grew taro more as an experiment" in "small areas approx-
imately 20 x 20 feet. ,,83 From the same area the following year, ADO 
A. K. Jackson, recorded that people had been "planting .... taro very 
openly amongst the sweet potato" and thereby reducing to some exte!'lt the 
severity of the blight. 84 
By the early 1960's, despite years of testing and experimenting, 
the people of the Siwai-Buin region still had found no blight-resistant 
,\ 
.. 
or even blight-tolerant varieties of taro. In 1960, Ag?icultural 
Officer G. E. Haling, after a patrol to the eastern Shrai area, wrote: 
Original native taro ... is almost extinct in this area, 
only 2 small gardens were noticed. Immediately post war 
the disease Phytophthora colocasiae swept the area, elim-
inating Colocasia varieties. No disease-resistant strains 
were noticed. 85 
Agricultural Officer M. L. Jones reported a similar situation from 
Western Siwai in 1962. 86 In the same year, after a patrol to the Orava 
area of S.E. Buin, Jones wrote the following concerning P. colocasiae: 
This disease attacks Taro colocasia in all places in 
the area. It comes in cycles which from enquiry 
appear related to the incidence of rain and sub-
sequent humidity. No ~artially resistant types 
were seen_or reported. e7 
In 1973, a few people in the Buin-Siwai region were still experi-
menting with small numbers of taro plants here and there. In Siwai, 
interviews indicated that people had tried planting taro under the 
eaves of their houses to lessen the blight's severity, but without much 
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success. At Mabis Village in Banoni and at Moro Village in Buin, 
examples of such plantings were seen but the villagers in both cases 
stated that these plantings would be severely damaged (by the blight) 
during the next heavy rains. At Moro, it was learned that an old woman 
had made the plantings after purchasing the taro from mountain dwellers 
at the Buin market. 89 Although to this day no blight-resistant nor 
blight-tolerant varieties have been reported in Buin-Siwai, the people 
continue the search. An interview at Pariro Village in Buin revealed 
that some planting material from Buka had recently been imported, but 
that it too had failed to withstand the blight in Buin. 90 When asked 
.. 
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why this taro grew better on 3uka, the v:"llagers responded that there 
Although there had been less fighting on Buka, the number of 
Japanese occupying the isla.."'1d was great enough to cause hardship in 
itself. As earlier noted, by the close of the ·war, because of the 
hungry .Japanese, there was verJ little taro le.:'t on Buka. Archer wrote 
in early 1946 "There are NO ":aro gardens :'r: the area, excepting for a 
few carefully guarded I nurSeries I fron "hie:l it is hoped later to obtain 
'tops' for replanting.,,92 '1'he process of multiplying the available taro 
was made all the more difficult by the presence of the blight. Father 
John Keady, who arrived at Gagan in 1947, remembered that because of 
the blight, only a few taro plants out of an entire garden would survive. 
These surviving plants would then be replanted and multiplied. The 
Gagan people told Father Keady, that they were looking for some 
ttstrongpeta taI'o. II He said that they had shown "remarkable tenacity" 
in these attempts to re-establish their taro. 93 By 1948, according to 
a DASF patrol report, most gardens along the east and northwest coasts 
contained small areas of taro, except at Tandeki Village where the 
people had Ei ven it up altogether. However, the report stated, " ... in 
all cases signs of the disease Phytophthora coZocasiae were visible in 
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varying degrees of severity." In April of 1949, patrol officer B. A. 
McLarty reported that in the Solos speaking areas of Buka, "taro crops ,\ 
have repeated.ly failed •.. " and that s·weet potato had become the staple 
food. 95 
Agricultural Officer Gordan Wilson, visited a number of Buka 
villages in November of 1949. He reported that while the situation 
with regard to taro had not cha11ged much during the past year, some 
progress was being made: 
All taro seen was a~~ected by Phytophthora but by a 
process of natural selection the more tolerant var-
ieties are becoming more evident &,d these do reach 
maturity although the yield is usually low. As a 
result taro is again an article of diet, although a 
minor one, in some villages ... 96 
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After inspecting gardens at Kohina, Hapan, Gagan and Nova in the 
Solos speaking section of Buka, A. K. Jackson wrote the following in 
June of 1950: "Throughout this area the taro crop is being affected 
by a blight, however the people are persevering and have achieved some 
success with a hardier variety of taro which they purchase at a very 
high price from natives of Halia sub-division ... ,,97 
By the early 1950's, then, some more or less blight-tolerant var-
ieties of" taro had been found. However from the end of 1951 through 
1954, during his stay on Buka, DASF Regional Controller, Eric IO/ilson, 
recalled that even though certain varieties reached craturity, the yield 
obtainable ¥as still not sufficient to permit the re-establishment of 
98 taro as the staple. In early 1956, Agricultural Officer M. J. Mead, 
after a patrol of Buka, wrote, "The basic food of the Buka Island people 
is sweet potato ... it is noted however that taro is again being planted 
in larger proportion and being attacked only mildly by the disease.,,99 
Later in the year in another Buka patrol report, Mead wrote: 
Taro is still increasing in popularity as a food crop 
but as more extensive gardens are planted so the di-
sease Phytophthora coZocasiae seems to be more da~aging. 
Sweet potato is still the basic food bu-c. ,;,hen taro is 
bearing well it is eaten almost solely as the basic 
food. IOO 
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In ,the early 1960 IS. seven clones of 3u..lca ta=o were tested :f02' 
blight resistance at the Lowlands Agricultural Experiment Station at 
Keravat on New Britain. Of the seven, only the clone "Seeru fl from 
Lemankea village was fOlli~d to be moderately ~esistant; the remaining 
six ·were only wealdy resistant. The resistance levels assigned to the 
seven clones were only relative, based on the number of blight-free 
leaves on a highly susceptable Hew Britain clone .101 Interview"s with 
Buka villagers made in 1973, confirmed that cf the varieties now grown, 
none is totally resistant to the blight. However the villagers said 
that the variety known as Siru is only the second most resistant 
variety. At Lemanmanu, HancJlan I, and reta, all in the Halia language 
area, those interviewed maintained that Bioil was the most blight-
resistant ~~d ab~~dant variety, while Siru was second to Bibil. At 
Gagan, in the Solos language area, Bibil is ~10·wn as Bubuin ~~d Siru as 
Sin, but the people interviewed agreed that Bubuin (Bibil) was the I:l.ost 
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resistant variety they possessed. 
Although there are no available figures shewing the relative levels 
of consumption for taro vs. sweet potato on Buk~ today, the 1973 inter-
views indicated that throughout the island sweet potato is eaten more 
often than taro. Furthermore the interviews revealed that the varieties 
of taro now eaten were considered to be among the less desirable var-
103 ieties grown before the war. "The favorite varieties were lost ei ther "~ 
during the war or because of the blight. 
In the low-lying areas from Buka Passage down the east coast of 
Bougainville to the Buin Sub-district boundary, the attempts to re-
establish taro after the war were not as successful as those on Buka~ 
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nor as unsuccessful as those in Buin-Siwai. As in other areas there 
was a shortage of planting material during the period of readjustme~t 
and rehabilitation following the end of the war. At the end of 1946 
C. W. Slattery reported from the Sailo-Teop .area that the gardens of 
the hill people contained taro but that at least half of it was in-
fected with the "prevailing disease." The coastal villages needed 
"taro shoots" for planting and it was hoped that seme would soen ar:::-i ve 
from New Britain. l04 By mid-1948 the coastal villages had been able to 
plant taro but it suffered severely from the blight. l05 A 1952 patrol 
report noted that.because of the continuing severity of the blight the 
coastal villages had switched to sweet potato as the main crop. The 
report also noted that inland gardens were less affected by the blight 
while mountain gardens were "free entirely.,,106 Taro continued to be 
planted but a 1955 patrol stated that the coastal villages still were 
producing very little. l07 
Apparently the situation in the Teop-Sailo area has changed very 
108 little right up to the present. Kirk Shoffner reports from Teop 
that along the coast taro is grown, but to ~uite a limited extent. He 
says that taro constitutes a verY low percentage of the starch intake 
for the coastal people, and that much of the taro ~hat is consumed 
comes from the mountains by way of trade with the mountain peoPle. l09 
In the Aita census division south of Teop, the story is very 
similar except that for some reason the people of this area relied 
more on kong kong taro (Xanthosoma spp.) as a substitute for tru 
t 110 aro. Bu~ they too were very diligent in their endeavors to re-
establish their prewar staple. A 1950 patrol report stated: "The 
..,-1 .. 
natives claimed that they had not had a. disease-free [taro] crop since 
the war but persist in their efforts with the hope of eyentually obtain-
. . t... . t ,,111 ~ng a reS1S anv varle y. Patrol reports from the early 1950's show 
that they were apparently u.."lsuc::::es:3:t'L;.1 for they continued to rely on 
k k ... 112 ong .ong ",aro. 
In the Rotokas Census Division al1d in the low-lying areas surround-
ing Kieta, sweet potato became the staple during the postwar years but 
as in ot'her areas taro was continually tested in the hope that even-
113 6 tually it could be reinstituted as the staple. In 195 , Agriculture 
Officer D. W. Macaulay reported that in the Kieta region it was "still 
not possible to grow taro in the lower areas owing to the taro-wilt 
(Phytophthora coZ.ocasiae).,,114 However by 1959, Agriculture Officer 
G.J. Harvey in discussing the blight in South Nasioi wrote: "A def-
inite development of resistance to the disease by most of the varieties 
has been reported. ,,115 But Harvey only mentioned observing such resist-
ance in gardens planted above 2000 feet. 116 
In 1973, the people of Tourepera V"illage, on the coast between 
Kieta and Aropa, s~ated that ~hey had some partially resistant taro 
(it gets the blight but usually does not die). But they empha.sized 
that the situation was not the same as before the war. They now only 
ate taro some of the time, relying on sweet potato as their main food. 117 
Interviews with Aropa Valley residents revealed a s.imilar situation, ,\ 
although sam€. Aropa people have their gardens at elevations up to 2000 
feet and gi yen favorable 'tfeather conditions do produce a certain amount 
of taro. Nevertheless, sweet potato remains their staple food. lIB 
Generally speaking the response to the taro blight by the people 
of Bougainville-Buka does not detract from their reputation as skilled 
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horticulturalists. Their explanation that the blight was caused by 
some "medisen bi'long born" is not at all unreasonable given their lack 
of knowledge concerning disease-causing fungi. It should be recalled 
that the true cause of the Irish Potato Blight of the 1840's was not 
clearly understood until the 1870's.119 As earlier noted, some 
Bougainvillians believed that the blight lesions on the taro leaves 
were caused by volcanic ash settling on the taro at night. W. H. 
McNeill, in writing about the Irish Potato Blight, reported that in 
Britain, in 1847, "A medical doctor stated that the blight was due to 
volcanic action upsetting the balance of the atmosphere ..• ,,120 In the 
1973 interviews representing ten census divisions, there was no re-
collection of any taro disease ever having been as devastating as the 
taro blight. Informants co~d only cite too much rain (flooding) and 
too much sun (drought) as causes of past taro failures. In all ten 
census divisions, people identified and named other taro diseases and 
pests but in no case did they attribute to them the destructiveness of 
the taro blight. All areas identified the taro beetle and what appears 
to be a virus dise'9,se of taro (leaves crinkled and feathering between 
veins) as ancient problems--the ancestors also had them. There were 
remedies or medisen for most, if not all, the familiar taro pests and 
diseases. These remedies varied from family to family and village to 
village but often involved the burning of leaves, bark, or roots in the 
taro garden. Some procedures insured that the taro would grow well in 
the face of all problems but other medisen(s) were for specific 
diseases. One Sivai man, the son of a kind of traditional didiman 
(agricultural extension agent), named and described three taro diseases 
and an insect pest, and related his ~at~er J s remedies for _ 121 each. 
Some of the procedures described were obviously cereoonial or magical 
in nature but others utilized the juice of certain crushed plants and 
water from green coconuts and involved the :-e~oval and destruction of 
discolored or crinked leaves. Two of the diseases had virus-like 
symptoms, the other was a kind of rot, and the insect was the taro 
beetle (Papuana spp.). Wl:ether or net these traditional remedies had 
any scientific merit is not kncIIT., out the important thing is that the 
established pests and diseases had traditionally been kept in check. 
The established diseases had never affected ~~ entire garden as the 
blight does--most informants agreed that only a few plants out of a 
garden would be infected with a particular disease at a particular 
time. When the rapid devastation of the taro blight arrived abruptly 
after the WE..r, what were they :0 think? Host informants stated that 
they had tried their traditional medisen against the blight but it had 
failed. Many have concluded that since the disease was caused by a 
European medisen, only a European medisen can stop it. Indeed, during 
the interviews the people often asked for medis2n for their taro--they 
assumed that surely some "medisen biZong Amerika" could haye been 
supplied to cure their sick taro. Although still cooperative, they 
were often a little disappointed that all that was wanted, was to 
record the stan of the "sik bilong taro. 11 
The response of the people of Bougainville-Buka to the taro blight 
was as adequate as could be expected, short of the frequent (but pro-
hibitively costly) application of fungicides. The people of Kunua and 
Keriaka quickly learned that the blight was less severe at higher 
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elevations. The Buka people, having no mountains to move into, imme-
diately took up the search for some strongpeZa taro. While neither 
they nor anyone else has yet discovered a totally blight-resistant or 
immune variety, they did succeed in isolating some which are semi-
resistant or tolerant. Unfortunately the people of Buin and Siwai had 
very little success in their endeavors to combat the blight. But 
. there was little they could do in the face of the almost year-round 
blight-favoring climatic conditions which occur in their region. In 
the end, the assumption that this foreign disease requires a foreign 
solution may prove to be correct. 
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CHAPl'ER IV 
Some Taro Blight-related Changes on Bougainville-Buka 
The introduction of the fungus, Phytophothora coZocasiae~ into 
Bougainville-Buka resulted in important changes in the lives of a 
large proportion of the indigenous population. These changes can be 
broken down into (1) those stemming from the loss or diminished re-
. liability of' taro as the staple crop and (2) those resulting from the 
substitution of sweet potato as the new staple crop. The former 
changes will be discussed first. 
The movement of villages and gardens to.hig?er elevations in 
Keriaka and Kunua as a response to the taro blight was discussed in 
Chapter III. It is not known whether or not these movements were 
permanent, since no interviews were conducted in these areas during 
1973. There is however some evidence that at least many of the gardens 
in the Keriaka Census Division remain at higher elevations. From in-
formation gathered during the 1966 census, David Lea found the Keriaka 
Census Division to be the only area of Bougainville-Buka in which 
"taro" has remained the most important food. l Lea's category "taro" 
includes Xanthosoma spp. as well as CoZocasia escuZenta, but in view 
of earlier postwar reports (from the 1950's) it is likely that CoZocasia 
remains the more important of the two types. If taro is in fact still 
the most important food in Keriaka, the implication is that since the 
blight continues to adversely affect lowland cultivation, the gardens, 
if not the villages, must still be situated at higher elevations. 
'l'he ('{)lncidl'ncc or t.he! Dprcud of the taro blight throup;hout 
Bousainville-Buka with World War II makes it difficult to attribute 
y. 
.' 
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any given change solely to the effects cf the 'olig.."f1t. For example, the 
trade or barter involving (a.rJ.ong other things) taro and fish which had 
traditionally taken place in many parts of Bougainville-Buka was first 
interrupted by the war but then hampered by the blight-related scarcity 
of taro. The British anthropologist, Beatrice Blackwood, described in 
detail the exchange of fish by the people of the Petats and Saposa 
Island groups for taro from the inland dwelling villagers of Buka and 
? 
Northern Bougainville as it cc::ured in 1929-30.~ She wrote, "The fish-
taro exchange is a permanent feature in the life of all the.villages in 
this area."3 Unfortunately it was not as "permanent" as she had as-
sUIDed. Fred Archer reported in 1946 that the barter between the islands 
west of Buka and the Buka mainland had not "been recommenced since the 
hostilities ceased," because the islands' fishermen lacked the necessary 
4 fishing equipment such as lines, hooks, and nets. Today Archer recalls 
that due to the scarcity of taro the traditional bartering system was 
never resumed in its prewar fashion. 5 Nowadays there is a twice-weekly 
market at Chinatown on Buka Passage where taro and fish are sold, but 
apparently mainly on a cash basis. Interviews at Lemanmanu revealed 
that the long-established exchanging of taro from Northern B~~a for pigs 
6 from Nissan ceased after the war. Ogan noted that fish-taro exchanges 
in the Aropa Valley area between coastal and inland peoples also ceased 
after the war. 7 
The decline of traditional bartering involving taro might have 
taken place without the occurrence of the blight. The increased use of 
Australian money together with the disrupting influence of the war might 
have yielded the same results. However the adoption of sweet potato as 
the substitute for taro undoubtedly was one factor in the decline of 
bartering, for groups with land unsuitable for taro might well be able 
to grow sweet potato and therefore get by without exchanging their 
fish. 8 This seems to have been the case along the coast in the Teop 
area, although as previously noted, the Teop people are again exchang-
ing fish for taro on a limited scale. 9 
The loss of taro as the most important crop in most areas of 
Bougainville-Buka was a serious blow culturally. There were at least 
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two aspects to the cultural importance of taro. One was the culturally 
derived personal preference for the taste, texture, appearance, and 
what might be termed the "satiating qualityH of taro (after eating taro 
one does not feel hungry, say taro-eaters). The other aspect was the 
importance and emphasis which cultural values placed on cultivating, 
exchanging, and consuming taro. During and after the war when the 
people of Bougainville and Buka were first deprived of taro, their im-
mediate reaction must have been a sense of personal disappointment. Taro 
had been their favorite food, indeed the only food which really filled them 
up and kept them strong. It had long been considered a basic necessity. Their 
sense of loss and accompanying disillusionment, as recorded by Europeans who 
witnessed it, have already been considered in Chapter III. However, the 
mystique surrounding this food, with all the popular notions regarding 
its strength-giving qualities needs to be emphasized. Long-time Buka 
resident, Fred Archer, expresses the popular pre-war beliefs about taro 
which apparently were even held by Europeans: 
... it was the staple article of diet with the natives and 
was supposed (by many "experts") to have all necessary 
ingredients to supply all vitamins--plus energy--to the 
person who cons~ed taro. It was a much prized 
article of diet and. "Jnat coulrl be done by a native on a 
fe'" taros--cooked i:l the ashes 8.J."ld carried in a basket--
on arm or by ha..Tld--was astr)n:'shing--lcng ~ ourneys done 
by road and hard 'Wo!'k--wi th a dri:rlk .of water from a 
stream or a kulau (drinking nut) from a palrrl . .l0 
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Among the Siwai, in 1938-39, Oliver noted that other starch foods 
were considered. to be second best, "most adults insisting that taro 
alone gives them the feeling of stuffed satiation which should accompany 
every satisfactory !:leal. ,,11 From 3u .. l{a 8.11d Northern Bougainville, 
Blackwood observed in 1929-30, that taro was the s"taple and stated, 
"no meal, whatever else is included, is complete vithout it, and it 
will, if' necessity arises, suffice for a meal by itself."l2 In the 
intervie',rs conducted in 1973, most older people who remembered when taro 
was the most important food still prefer it over all others, stating 
that it makes them feel strong and fills them ,up more than sweet potato. 
The younger people, however, seemed not to have ~TlY special preference 
for taro, having been reared mainly on sweet potato (except in the moun-
tains where taro is eaten more often and probably preferred by everyone). 
The idea that eating taro gives one the feeli:1g of "stuffed satia-
tion" like no other starch food appears to be widespread among those 
people who are reared on taro as the staple food. The present-day in-
. habitants of Western Samoa are such a people and have verJ strong 
feelings about the superiority of tp~o over all other starchy foods. 
They say tha"v taro is the food which provides the greatest feeling of J 
satiation ('E sili atu Ze talo 'e ma/ana lelei ai).l3 Among the Maenge 
of East New Britain (about 225 miles due west of Northern Bougaimrille), 
there is the belief that taro has a soul and that, "The presence of 
nl4 soul in edible plants ... makes them heavy... If taro is cultivated 
.. 
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properly, using the appropriate type of magic, the corm of the taro will 
be "big and heavy." "When such a density of soul is obtained, to eat 
only a very small piece of corm is enough to satisfy one completely.,,15 
In the ethnographic literature from Bougainville-Buka there are no 
known reports of taro possessing a soul. However, it should be re-
called that in Siwai, the explanation given for the postwar failure of 
taro, but not sweet potato, was that taro was more like a man and could 
feel sick frJm the wartime medisen which hud poisoned the ground. Also 
Beatrice Blackwood mentioned that at Kurtatchi Vil.1.age in Northern 
Bougainville, "special kinds of taro with red.stalks, •.. extra fine 
varieties," were planted in a strategic way so that they could, "talk 
t th d ' t ' 'W t . kl ,,, 16 Furth o e or ~nary aro say~ng: emus grow qu~c y.... ~ er 
research could rev.eal that possession of a soul may be yet another 
human-like cnaracteristic attributed to taro by some inhabitants of 
Bougainville-Buka. 
While not all the cultural groups on Bougainville-Buka can be 
assumed to have had identical values ~egarding the cultural significance 
of taro, all groups did regard it very highly and expended much energy 
in cultivating it or in obtaining goods which could be exchanged for 
taro. Garden magic and special ceremonies were usually associated with 
its cultivation and it played an important role in other rituals and 
celebrations. Oliver gave the following elucidatory account of the 
prewar importance of taro among the Siwai people: 
Taro occupies so prominent a place in Siwai life that 
one might appropriately go on for pages describing 
the numerous varieties grown; the exact details of 
planting, weeding, and harvesting; the high value 
placed upon it as the vegetable food; the feelings of 
deprivation natives express when they must go without it; 
.. 
the freque!1cy '..;i th which it enter:::; into conversatio::; 
the nu,:nerous met.aphors for it a!1d its use in ritual; 
etc •.. rather than burden the reader with a long technical 
account, however justified that ~ay be by the importance 
of the topic, I merely ask him to remember that Siuai 
natives spend :lore hours growing taro. than in any other 
enterprise, that the plant comprises 80 percent of their 
diet, and that it is the basis of t:1.eir SUbsistence 
economy generally. If that is forgotten during consid.-
eration of more dramatic activi-l:;ies, then true pers-
pective on Siuai life will have ~een lost.17 
.. 
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Oliver recorded~ among others, the following ritualistic or symbolic 
uses of taro by the Siuai: whole taro plants were used s'j'T!lbolically in 
b .... . ". ~ t 18... t t b d ' apv1sm ceremon1es tor 1nran s; ~aro ¥as no ea en y mourners ur1ng 
the formal period of :lourning f:>r a deceased person;19 whole taro plants 
from the garden of the deceased were hung on a special railing next to 
20 the funeral pyre; taro from the deceased's garden was cooked and 
placed on the cremation ashes for cons1.llnption by the ghost of the de-
. . 21 
ceased. In addition taro was served at most feasts, usually in the 
form of steamed portions served on a platter, but often also in a much-
t d t t dd ' 22 es eeme coconu - aro pu 1ng. 
Similar uses of taro were recorded by Blackwood for Northern 
Bougainville and Buka and it is likely that such uses were widespread 
in Bougainville-BUka. The Aropa Valley Nasioi had a practice, known as 
ungumo in their tongue, which involved a tabu on taro-eating by certain 
kin of a recently deceased person. A section of a type of vine was ~orn 
J 
as an armband around the upper arm to show that an individual could not 
t t t 'l th . t f t h 'd 'th t - 23 ea arc un l e approprla e eas was ,e~ removlng e aou. But 
today the practice has been discontinued, the people say, because it 
is now no special hardship to go without taro, since it is only avail-
24 
able occasionally anyway. Taro puddings were favorites in many if 
III 
not most sections of Bougainville-Buka. They are still made occasion-
ally in the Aropa v~lley for such special events as growing up feasts. 25 
However in Buin and Siwai feast day puddings must now be made of sago 
or tapioca, because due to the blight, suff{cient amounts of taro ~e 
simply unobtainable. Not even the higher elevation villages have 
26 
enough to sell. 
Because taro was so important ceremonially and because people were 
so attached to its special qualities as a satisfying food, much emphasis 
was given to its proper cultivation. To insure a good crop, especially 
one that was better than the crop of one's neighbors, many types of 
garden magic and special ceremonies were relied upon. The fact that 
both Blackwood and Oliver, writing on two geographically, linguistically, 
and culturally distinct groups, reported the ~ssociation of taro with 
ritual and garden magic suggests that similar associations must have 
existed in most areas of Bougainville-Buka. 
At Siwai, Oliver found that garden magic was not practiced by all 
households. Many men however did utilize mixtures of ~agical ingre-
dients especially developed and passed on with specific varieties of 
taro. Before a new garden was planted, a "consecrated decorative shrub" 
was planted in a special corner of the garden and then annointed with 
the mixture of magical materials, thus insuring that the taro to be 
planted would be "large and healthy, and able to survive drought or 
destructive magic.,,27 Those not possessing magic or good varieties of 
taro could and did purchase the taro alone or the taro plus the magic 
from those willine to sell. 28 Blackwood found that the people of 
Kurtatchi Village (N. Bougainville) had a host of specific "medicines" 
for specific pr:>blens. ':'?1ere were 3. m.ll::cer or~ plfu'lt sc!·a:ppi.~lgs fl..."1d/or 
roots which were chewed ".ri::h the betel nixture (Areca, line, and betel 
pepper) and applied to taro staJJ:,:s at planting to insure the production 
29 
of large healthy taro corns. Specially prepared twigs buried on the 
garden path kept out intruding pigs ~"1d special stones were placed in 
the garden to r::.ake tli.e taro r;.row "-<0 stro:1g.-J Gardens planted for spedfic 
feasts receiyed very specialized tl'eat:::ent. Blacbrood described the 
lengthy planting ceremony whi::::h i::-~cluded such t,hings as: the burning 
of special leayes -which caused th:.cl-:. smcke to settle over the ground 
to blind ~"1wanted intruders (ghosts ar.d pigs); the planting of special 
decorative shrubs such as CordyLine to make the taro grow well; and the 
application of a magical mixt'~e of secret plants and minerals to all 
planting material, digging poles, ~"1d to the hands of the women planters, 
to insure the success of the garden. 31 
The Nasioi of Aropa Valley and Kongara made a magical mixture of 
plant materials, taro roots snd sometines a certain kind of orange 
stone, which they kept inside their houses in a special coconut shell. 
When a new garden was planted, some roots of the new planting material 
were added to the mixture. In Aropa Valley the mix·t;ure was sprinkled 
on the new taro plants to make them grow large corms. At Kongara, the 
orange stone was placed at the bottom of the coconut shell containing 
the mi~ure &.d stored in the gardener's house. After a specified J 
period, if tee orange stone rose to the top of the mixture it meant that 
32 the garden would produce a good crop of taro. Such coconut shell 
containers can ~till be found at Kongara. 
Neither Blacl,w('cd nor Oliver mentioned any garden magic developed 
for specific pe~~t::; alld diseases of taro. However, interviews in 1973 
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showed that in every area visited, specific medisen{s) had been used 
against specific taro pests and diseases. In Siwai, one older mumi 
(bigman or leader) mentioned a medisen for a taro disease which causes 
the corm to become rotten. He said that in his family, they placed a 
leaf of a "taro biZong bus" {wild self-propagating CoZocasia} under the 
base of the taro stalk when it was planted in its hole. Because this 
wild variety of taro is very hardy and strong (although having inedible 
corms), his family had reasoned that this strength would be passed on 
to the domesticated taro. 33 In Aropa Valley leaves of various plants 
are used in the same manner to insure a good taro crop.34 At Pariro 
Village in Buin, an elongated type of coconut shell painted red and 
filled with magical herbs was kept in the house (similar to the !~asioi 
practice) to protect taro from being eaten by Papuana beetles. 35 In all 
of the six linguistic areas visited in 1973, when informants were shown 
photographs of taro leaves showing virus-like symptoms (feathering 
and/or crinkling of the leaves), they claimed to be familiar with at 
least one taro disease with similar symptoms and further claimed to 
possess specific medisert or other procedures for dealing with it. Sim-
ilar claims were made concerning Papuana beetles. Some informants in 
KOngara displayed taro with a disease which made the corms so hard that 
only pigs could eat them. In most areas familiarity with corm rot 
diseases was claimed; some treatments were related. But in no case was 
there claimed a medisen for the blight. 
Now that the traditional importance of taro and its successful 
cultivation in Bougainville-Buka has been examined, what can be said 
about the changes which occurred as a result of its demise as the staple 
.. 
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food? Certainly the decline of cerer;:ony a,r.,.' !TIagic associated with taro 
must have influenced changes in other traditional ways of doing things. 
Eric Wilson, the Agricultural Officer who was stationed on Buka in the 
early 1950's, recalls that older r;:er. especially in the Hanahan area, 
tried to re-establish taro a,s a ~ea.l'l.S of reasserting themsel yes and the 
"old "Nays" which 'Nere suffering because of the disruption and social 
disorganization follo-Ning the -Nar. 36 ':T.'he wartime loss of many taro 
varieties a.."l.d their associated growth magic (which had been passed on 
for generations), along with the total failure of traditional garden 
magic in the face of the devastation of the taro blight, undoubtedly 
undermined the confidence people had in traditional modes of behavior. 
But before assessing these changes any further, it is necessary to con-
sider the changes resulting from the adoption of sweet potato as the 
new staple. For these changes are interrelated and oyerlap with the 
changes resulting from the forced abandonment of taro. 
An important change due to the adoption of a foreign crop such as 
sweet potato, as the staple, was that, generally speaking, garden magic 
was not widely used in its cultiyation nor did it figt~e in other cere-
monies as had taro. However, Oliver states that in Siwai, the sa~e 
principles of magic which were employed for the protection and growth 
of taro were also used for other crops including sweet potato, although 
"not used as frequently as for taro. ,,37 Blackwood found only a single 
example of magic used in sweet potato cultivation. A Petats Island man 
brought her a large stone which he tad formerly placed in his sweet 
potato garden to make the tubers grow large and palatable, but which he 
" . ,,38 no longer wanted, having come under missionary influence. The use 
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of such magic for sweet potatoes must have been rare, for in no case 
during the 1973 interviews did any informant respond in the affirmative 
when asked about medisen for sweet potato. Indeed, at Siwai, two rea-
sons were given why no medisen or ceremonies were used for sweet potato: 
one, sweet potato grows so easily that no medisen of ceremonies are 
required;39 and two, no ceremonies or magic exist for sweet potato be-
cause it originated in a foreign place, having been brought to Siwai in 
relatively "recent" times. 40 At Aropa Valley the same two reasons were 
. . "1 t th t' 41 If d ' d g~ven ~n s~m~ ar responses 0 e same ques ~on. gar en mag~c an 
ritual had been frequently associated with the cultivation of sweet 
potato in Bougainville-Buka, such a situation would constitute a stark 
exception to practices in neighboring regions. In fact, A. J. Kimber, 
after compiling data on the cUltivation of sweet potato from 60 local-
ities throughout Papua New Guinea, stated: 
The survey has shown that as a general rule, there is 
no ritual associated with the cUltivation or consumption 
of sweet potato, a feature which contraets with other 
subsistence crops such as yams or taro. 2 
Thus, the new reliance on sweet potato, an exotic crop, without 
established ritual associated with it, caused gardening in postwar 
Bougainville-Buka to lack the traditional more magical and mystical 
aura which once surrounded it. To people so accustomed to the us.e of 
ritual and magic,this change must have taken some of the satisfaction 
and excitement (destructive garden magic was also employed by one's 
enemies) out of subsistence gardening. In evaluating this event, the 
possible strong attac~ment to the ritual or even mystical qualities of 
taro should not be underestimated. Either due to the crop's great 
• 
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antiquity, or to some inherent esthetic quality it possesses, Or' :'0 
a combination of factors, it has l"'etair~-:;d. a ceremonial significar.ce 
over a wide area, even where other crops now constitute the main 
sources of food. In sections of the Philippines wnere rice is the 
t 1 t . 1 t d '11 d d" 1" 't 1 43 s ap e, aro ~s p an e ceremon~a y ~~ use ~n re~~g~ous r~ ua s. 
Among the Central Enga of the New Guinea Highlands, sweet potato is the 
main food, but limited amounts of taro are distributed as prestige 
44 food. On the island of Timor where it is believed root crops preceded 
rice as the staple foods, a taro leaf is still used in br~~ds of 
ownership. 45 The geographer, William C. Clarke, has f01l.."1d that, 
"throughout the whole Pacific, taro is a crop with ritual and pres-
t · . . t· ,,46 ~g~ous assoc~a ~ons. 
It has already been stated as well as implied that sweet potato 
is an easier crop to grow than taro. Before examining the significance 
of this fact, the statement itself needs to be clarified and expa.'1.ded. 
Gardeners on Bougainville-Buka, who have grown or who now grow both 
crops, readily state that the cultivation of sweet potato requires less 
effort and provides a larger and more l"'eliable yield, than does the 
cultivation of taro. 47 There are several reasons 'for this. First of 
all sweet potato provides a higher yield per acre, in terms of both 
weight and calories. While precise quantitative information is not 
available comparing the yields of the two crops on Bougainville-Buka, 
using local gardening practices on local soils, data from other areas 
together with Oliver's Siwai data on taro, can provide a reliable in-
dication of what could be expected on Bougainville-Buka. At Keravut, 
on New Britain, the DASF conducted sweet potato trials where yields of 
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over 25,000 pounds per acre were obtained,48 and A. J. Kimber stat,es 
that this would be a good estimate for all low-lying areas of Papua 
New Guinea. 49 In Siwai when taro was the staple, Oliver found that 
"151 pounds of edible taro" were grown in each 450 sq. ft. Plot 50 __ 
which amounts to about 14,600 pounds per acre. Even though, on the 
average, taro has about 12.5% more calories per pound than sweet 
potato,5l the much greater yield of sweet potato, more than compen-
sates for this difference. In fact the actual yields of sweet potato 
per acre per year on Bougainville are probably much larger than the 
25,000 pounds per acre Keravat figure, which was for a single crop 
only. Donald Mitchell found that the Nagovisi of Southwestern Bougain-
ville obtai~ed up to four consecutive sweet potato crops from the same 
piece of land and that the yields decreased by only 25 percent for the 
second crop and only dropped another 25 percent for both the third and 
52 fourth crops. The fact that the Nagovisi and many ~ther groups53 
obtain multiple sweet potato crops from the same land emphasizes the 
less demanding requirements of this crop with regard to soil fertility. 
All available information on taro cultivation on Bougainville-Buka 
indicates that traditionally, only a single crop of taro could be 
obtained at a time--the next crop had to wait for years of bush fallow-
ing to replenish the nutrients taken from the soil by the earlier crop. 
Fallowing periods for taro on Bougainville-Buka varied considerably 
from area to area. Oliver found that the Siwai waited only about six 
years before replanting taro on the same land,54 Donald Mitchell 
reported a figure of about 25 years from Nagovisi,55 and Blackwcod 
reported what would amount to even a greater period in Northern 
,. 
llS 
.. 56 Bouga~nv~lle . With the less-de~anding re(lui::-e.'T.er~ts of sweet :pot,.t,o, 
such long fallowing periods would be expec':ed to diminish. Interviews 
in 1973 at Kongara (Nasioi area) and Buka indicated that fallowing 
periods as low as three t:) £,i ve years are used for bO-Cl-l taro and sweet 
potato. Finally, sweet potato is easier to grm.; because of "its rela-
tive freedom from pests and diseases.,,57 
If the population of Bougainville-Bu .. ~a continues to increase at 
. t t t ( " 5 11 ' 58 "1 " " . d ). S presen ra e over.). perce!l"': annua _y), t.ne ess Cl.emannlng Ian 
requirements of sweet potato will become increasingly significant. 
Indeed they have already become important in some areas. In Nagovisi, 
because of the spectacularly greater productivity of sweet potato over 
taro, Donald Mitchell found that although the population has approx-
imately doubled since the war, no additional land has had to be brought 
into the gardening-bush-fallowing cycle. In other words, the same 
amount of secondary forest land 'N'hich was previously utili zed in the 
taro groving agricultural cycle before the war is now, because of the 
switch to sweet potato, being used to support about twice the previous 
population. No additional primary forest has had to be cleared since 
59 the war. 
The labor requirements for sweet potato cultivation are generally 
considered to be less than those for taro cultivation. H. C. Brookfield 
states that in Western Melanesia, by changing from taro to sweet potato,,\ 
"higher yielcls are obtainable for equal or less input.,,60 The pre-
viously mentioned greater yields per acre, which are further enhanced 
through multiple cropping, mean that much less time is spent clearing 
land each year. Less -,;eeding is usually required for sweet potato 
-'.' .. "' ... ,~-, .... 
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because th.;: vines quict:':~Y grew to fc'rn1. e... goocJ b:'OU~l(i cover ;Hh:'2h con-
siderably limits the nu-'llber of weeds. Ki:nber ::cund. that, "Once -:he 
ground is covered 'weeding is easily and qui.ckly c.one and depe~lCling on 
climatic condi tLms, two to five T,.;eedings 2.re requil'ed before this stage 
~ 
;s 1"eacn' :-.,j. ,,01 A ' d"- f h " ~ 
.. _ ':: ru:o'tller a vanuage a t. e v~nlng r:ature 0:;: s;;eet pot-ato 
is that any section of vine, even sections are short as one foot or less, 
, " 62 can be used as planting mater~ai.. Thus, cont::'ary to the situatio:1 
t';xisting with taro, there is an enormous a.'1l0unt of readlly availaole 
planting material. 
One result of all these factors which make the growing of sweet 
potato easier than the growing of taro is that being a good Subsistence 
gardener has probably lost some of the respect it once had. Statements 
made in 1973 in many of the areas visited on Bougainville and Buka 
implied that growing sweet potato successfully was really not much of 
an accomplishment. It was claimed that one has only t-o "throwaway" a 
section of sweet potato vine onto the ground and it will put out roots 
and begin growing like any wild bush vine. This sentiment has probably 
functioned to help stimulate the 'tlidespread postwar interest in cash 
cropping. Oliver has pointed out that traditionally, the most important 
way to gain prestige was to become a famous feast-giver. 63 And being 
a good SUbsistence gardener, or being able to coordinate and ~obilize 
those who were, was a necessary aspect of this pro~ess. But nowadays, 
writes Oliver, "several other kinds of activities have acquired 
t " h" lOt" ,,64 pres ~ge-en anc~ng qua ~ les. Among those he lists, is Itmoney-
making, It , .. hich in most cases on Bcugainville-Buka, means cash-cropping. 
It should be apparent that the decreases in labor and' land require-
ments for sweet potato have also favored the development of cash-
plants and the production of cast. 
that in mest areas, cash-croppinb first acte·d to enccurage t:hcse adop-
tions of introduced crops) !'2.ther ·t;;:-l?.n vi ce--,T'.jrs a , the corrcl~'.ticn 
still holds true fer Bougainville-3dca. 
The switch from taro to sweet pot"1to did. not OCCllr without 3c:::e 
problems. Oliver noted that one ~::;'''rbac}: of rroducing s-,reet po-!;atoes 
was that, "they are more ter:.pting to pigs 2 .. nd require ::;tur::'i-::r ferlC~G 
than taro gardens do." He added "it is ss.id that pigs will exert 
t ""f t t b ak' t t.. .. d ,,66 grea er er or 0 re ln 0 a swee po ... a"o gar en. 'l'he patrol 
reports of the 1950 I S from the Nagovisi area indicate that there '.Tere 
continuing problems with pigs causing c;estruction of s-vI'eet potato 
crops. One patrol officer even claimed that "the majority of :~atives" 
of the Nagovisi area were "underfed)" because of the 1I1aclc of food ... 
. t th d t t' d 1... • • '"h ,,67 oWlng 0 e evas a lon cause ;.;y plgS 1n v e area. T..L· .... .co .... . J.. ... 15 Ql ...... l-
cult to know whether the situation was actually this serious, but tte 
reports do show that for years the owners of pi;s refused to enclose 
them, even though sweet potato garden,:> continued to be drunagecl. There 
was no tradition of keeping pigs penned up, nor did the Nagovisi deer!]. 
it worthwhile to build pig-proof :ences around their sweet potato 
gardens. During the same period, there were similar problems on BL~a. 
\ 
Even though free~y-roaming pigs were causing "great garden depredation," 
and patrol officers had consistently issued instructions for the plgS 
to be penned, the people 'Were "extremelY loath to follm., out these 
instructions," claiming that pigs had died "hen kept in pens. 68 ?at~'ol 
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Officer B. A. McCabe, insisted that the pigs had died in pens from 
"lack of food, water and shelter," and with threats of eventual court 
action against the pig owners, persuaded ten villages to raise the 
t h . . f· . 69 T d th . f money necessary 0 purc ase w~re plg- enclng'. 0 ay .e practlce 0 
confining pigs to certain areas (usually large) has become more wide-
spread. In 1973. an Aropa Valley woman was observed being threatened 
with a fine by the Local Government Council if she continued to allow 
her pig to freely roam about. 
There has been another problem with the substitution of sweet 
potato for taro as the staple crop. In Southern Bougainville, especially 
in Buin and Siwai, where the land is only gently sloping and there are 
broad alluvial plains, gardens are subject to frequent flooding. The 
relatively level land in this region together with the very high rain-
fall combine to worsen this problem. Since the war, the Administration 
has seen fit to provide food to the people of Buin and Siwai on three 
occasions, during the years of 1957, 1965, and 1972, in order to alle-
viate food shortages resulting from heavy rains and flooding. In addi-
tion during 1959, Cadet Patrol Officer R. W. McLellan, reported that, 
"heavy rains caused some damage to crops of the staple food kaukau.,,70 
Concerning the 1957 period of heavy rains, an August Patrol Report 
from Siwai stated the following: 
••• my patrol entered Siwai at a bad time: during the 
heavy rains which were subsequently to wash away some 
kaukau gardens and thoroughly soak the remaining gardens 
causing some of the kaukau to rot ... All throughout the 
Siwai kaukau gardens were affected ... It was found that 
there was a definite food shortage (although not a serious 
one). . 
With the food shortage as it is the Siwai people have 
resorted to their old standby food--sago ... It is to be 
rememberp.d that with -:he rain devastation only the kaul'\:.au 
" .. as harmed. The ot:le:c food items l::'sted [rice, peanuts.-7, 
d ] .. "," ~ b' 1 "'f" l' an corn ... are 'S,,::,_-,- :;.n a reasona J..y p en J... u..L S11PP y. -'-
In a Buin Patrol Repo!'t, also from August of 1957, K. GrallaIn, 
declared that there was "a threatened food shortage th:::-oughout the 
Buin Linguistic Area. I! But, stated. Grallam: 
the cause of the impending shortage is not so :much the 
actual rain damage, al-:hough this is exter..sive, but that 
the prolonged wet spell has preven'ted the establishing 
and planting of new gard.er.s ,,,hich should. have been 
prepa!'ed five months ago. However, should the gardens 
have been planted at this time, they also vould have 
7r-been badly damaged. I~ 
Graham went on to reccJ:Ull€nd, that since there ',.;as no substitute 
for sweet potato, and sago and coconuts were in short supply, "assist-
,,73 
anee is estimated as necessar'J ... for 4-5 months. He also noted that 
of the small amounts of rice and peanuts vhich were being grown, the 
t 1 t h d " -'-h . d t" 74 I 1 t -'-more ma ure pans a survJ..vea ~ e lntm alan. n a a er repor~ 
Graham stated that the government food assistance had ended by the 
middle of December. 75 
In 196576 and again in 1972 similar prolonged rainy periods 
occurred, the latter period beginning with the arrival of a cyclone in 
May 1972.77 In both cases government food vas provided as in 1957. An 
official DASF report on the 1972 food shortage reached the following 
conclusion in October of that year: 
Food production in subsistence gardens in the Buin Sub-
district has been severely curtailed by flooding and/or 
waterlogged soil conditions since June 1972 and Gardens 
will not be back to normal production until about December 
or Februaay 1973) providing normal weather conditions 
prevail. 7 
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The above report also mentioned that kong kong taro (Xanthosoma 
spp.) had not been so severely affected and that sweet potato planted 
in unusually high (for this region) mounds, .had produced larger tubers 
during the rainy period than those of neighboring gardens. The As-
sistant D.C. at Buin, M. Lang, after noting that taro had been the 
traditional staple before the war, wrote: "The people say that taro 
was not affected by high rainfall conditions to th= same extent as sweet 
potato and in traditional times this factor enabled them to survive con-
ditions like the present.,,79 Interviews with residents of Buin and 
Siwai, in 1973, found agreement with Lang's report that taro had better 
withstood very wet conditions. 
A primary drawback to depending on sweet potato in the Buin-Siwai 
area, then is its intolerance to waterlogged soil. Unlike taro, which 
thrives "in shady, damp, and even swampy places ,,,80 sweet potato needs 
"light, well-drained soilS," or "other types of soil with good artifi-
cial drainage. ,,81 Thus the problem is that sweet potato is not as 
ecologically suite~ to the conditions of Southern Bougainville as was 
taro. Until the people of this region begin to compensate for this 
fact, as many New Guinea Highlands people have done with their networks 
of high mounds and deep drainage ditches, they will continue to have 
periodic food shortages. However the chances of such changes occurring 
appear to be remote, for it seems likely that as long as the government 
continues to offer relief food supplies and the people continue to have 
enough cash to purchase a little rice to tide them over, they will be 
content to stick with their current gardening practices. 
.. 
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Finally, something should be said 2.bout t~e nutrition2.l C~l3.':1seS 
.which resulted from the switch :i:'rom "':.a1'o to 3 T,;reet ?otato. As previously 
discussed, the typical reaction to the necessarJ reliance on sweet 
potato immediately after the ·..rar, was '-chat TN'i thout taro, people would 
la.ck the required strength and stal':tina to resu.."lle their nor:nal everyday 
life. Also mentioned earlier, was the widespread belief among taro 
eaters, that because of the feelings of s3.t:'ety provided. by taro, it is 
superior to other sta:~chy foeds. The questions which arise are, to 
wha.t extent can these popular beliefs about taro be substantiated, and 
what were the nutritional effects of the switch to sweet potato? The 
ideal solution to the latter question, scientifically, would be to 
determine the exact amounts?! taro normally consumed by people in a 
specific village before the switch to sweet potato. Then the exact 
present-day consumption of sweet potato, grown on the same soil as the 
taro, should be determined. The results of a nutritional analysis 
from samples of both crops should be ebtained so that an exact compari-
son of the daily intake of protein, carbobydrates, vitamins, etc., 
could be made. Only by this method could the precise nutritional changes 
be determined. In the a.bsence of such information, o!11y the approximate 
nutritional differences between taro and sweet potato can be considered. 
Table 1 shows a comparison of the nutritional breakdown of 100 g 
of raw taro vs. 100 g of raw sweet potato. The figures for each cate- J 
gory' are mean values calculated by Dr. Margaret McArthur of Sydney 
University from reliable but divergent results of dif:ferent nutritional 
analyses of samples of the two crops. The comparison shows that in the 
important category of protein) taro contains aver 40% morz than sweet 
TABLE 1 
Nutritional Comparison of Taro and Sweet Potato 
Based on 100 g Raw Samples 
CAL. PROTEIN{g) FAT(g) CA(mg%) FE(g) VIT-A(g) THIA{mg%) RIB(g) NIA(g) VIT-C(mg%) 
SHEET POTATO 128 0.95 0.1 25 0.7 0.04 0.11 0.70 37 
TARO (Col. spp.) 144 1.4 0.2 42 0.01 0.27 0.20 6 
I--' 
I\) 
\.J1 
~ 
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potato. Taro also contains 12% :!lore calor:"es per 100 g than c.oes sweet 
potato. Thus the claims that taro is more filling th~~ sweet potato 
and that it provides more strength-giving nutrition are borne out, at 
least to a certain extent. The significance' of these differences in 
the daily lives of the people of Bougainville-J3uka, however, is 7ery 
difficult to assess. It would appear that any c.ecrease in protein 
intake resulting from the chac,ge from taro to sweet potato, would be 
made up for in part by the i~creased consumption of ti~ned meats and 
fish 82 which has acc'urred in recent years, due to the presence of cash 
income. 
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CHAPl'ER V 
Conclusion 
This study has shown that most probably the taro blight was present 
in some areas of Bougainville-Buka several years before the war, but 
that after the war the resultant shortage of planting material helped to 
spread it more rapidly throughout the entire area. Exactly how or when 
the disease arrived will probably never be known with any certainty, but 
all available evidence suggests that it probably appeared in the Solomon 
chain first on Bougainville or Buka or perhaps as far south as the 
Shortlands. From the Shortlands it progressed s~)Uth and east down the 
archipelago; the evidence simply fails to support the idea (held by some 
observers) that it originated farther down the chain and progressed in a 
northwesterly direction. 
In the early years after the war the blight was quite serious in 
all low-lying areas of Bougainville-Buka. During this time, because of 
pr~ssure from the Catholic missions on Bougainville, the Murray Adminis-
tration became interested in trying to re-establish taro in the area. 
The DASF program to find resistant varieties and better cultivation 
techniques began with good intentions but verJ shortly collapsed because 
of equipment and personnel shortages and probably a lack of sustained 
interest by the' Administration's higher officials. By the mid-1950's 
the government's position was that sweet potato and other crops were 
quite acceptable replacements for taro. Only in the 1960's was research 
on resistant varieties resumed by the DASF. 
Without help from the government, the indigenous people searched 
for their own solutions to the new taro disease. Many found that taro 
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could still be grown in the :::otL."1.~air:.s, b1J.1: ccastal (l:..;elle~s st2:"ugglecl 
to find resistant varieties. 'The 3'.Lka people succeeded i:1 find.ing some 
which are partially resista...'1t but have still !"wt been able to resume 
taro production as it existed before the bli-ght. In fact, throughout 
the low-lying areas of Bougainville-3~~a, ~ron all i:1dications, sweet 
potato is still the illost impcrta.r:.t food; taro is only ea-ce:1 occasio:1-
ally. In El'.in and Shmi, taro gro"\<7i::3: has bee:1 a total failure, owing 
to the exceptionally wet cli27.ati c co:ldi tions there. 
The displacement of taro as the staple crcp on Bougainville-Buka 
can be seen as yet 8.!"1other eX8Llple of the historical decline of this 
crop throughout the Pacific and perhE.:ps even throughout South and 
Southeast Asia. This decline might haye begun when sonewhere in 80uth-
east Asia, centuries ago, rice vas discovered as a veed growing in a 
flooded taro field--a theory r:entloned by Haudricourt and Hedin in 
19431 and since supported by such3.uthorities as Carl 8auer2 and 
Jacques Barrau. 3 The decline of taro growing in the Pacific area has 
been attributed to many factors, mest of which involve outside influences 
on traditional ways of doing things. Sometimes the reasons were asso-
ciated with collapses of traditional leadership and declines in popula-
tion, especially in wet-land taro growing areas where labor-intensive 
. ... . 4 terrac~ng and ~rrl.gatl.on ",rere requl.red. In other cases modern economic 
pressures have favored the s-,.;i t ch to crops requiring less labor. 5 As 
mentioned in Chapter IV, the decline of taro has often been associated 
with the growth of cash-cropping. This brings up the question of 
whether or not sweet potato ",.;auld have replaced taro on Bougainville-Buka 
after the war, eve::1 without the advent of the taro blight. From the 
.. 
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prewar cultura2. i:n;,ortance a..."ld. populari +:,y cf taro. froI!1~~s conti::meci. 
importance in the mOlJ.11tainOlJ.S parts of Boug3.inville today :md from the 
continued interest in taro expressed by many villligers eyen in 1973, 
the answer must be that despite some proc.able increases in sweet potato 
production, taro would have remained the rr.ost important food crop. The 
example of Western Samoa may be pointed out again. Here, taro has 
traditio!lalJy been the staple 8..'1d despite the i!lcreasing importa!lce -:)f 
cash crops competing for the extra labor reQ.uired for its prcduction, 
it is likely to remain so, bec8.1l3e of the people I s strong attachment to 
it. Such would probably have bee~ the case on Bougainville and Buka, 
without the arrival of the blight. 
It is hoped that this study will have helped to emphasize the im-
portance of plant diseases in huma..."l history. The significance of 
introduced biological pathogens attacking human populations directly, 
has received consideration by historians trying to assess tl:J.e impact of 
the European intrusion on Pacific Island societies. Now, especially 
with the recent advances of the taro blight into new areas in Micronesia, 
introduced plant diseases must be counted along with the introduced 
post-contact human diseases as part of the biological impact of European 
expansion in the Pacific area. 
,\ 
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APPENDIX A 
The 1973 Interviews and the MethodD Used 
From mid-October through December of 1973 I conducted oral history 
interviews with residents from 27 separate villages on Bougainville-
Buka. The following table tabulates the interviews in terms of census 
districts, giving the number of villages represented and the number of 
. inte~views per census district. The Census Districts are listed in the 
order in which they were visited. 
Table A.l 
Number of Interviews and Villages 
Represented per Census District 
Villages 
Census . District Re12resented Inter~,riews 
1- South Nasioi 6 9 
2. Kongara 2 7 
3. Siwai 6 8 
4. Paubakei 2 2 
5. MaIds 1 1 
6. Lugakei 2 2 
7. Teop 2 2 
8. Sailo 1 1 
9· Buka 4 9 
10. North Nasioi 1 
...l 
Totals 27 42 
The census divisions and the villages visited were selected mostly 
on the basis of practical considerations such as the availability of 
transport and accommodations. Within these limits a range of different 
environmental and cultural areas were included, as shown in the text. 
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The !II.anner in which the inte:::-vie.rs -.,;e:::'~ s~t up yariee t:::'om':3.rea to 
area. Often members of the DASF made ar!'angements 1'0:::' l:le to visit 
certain villages--the purpose of my visit was explained and I ',iaS in-
troduced. Similarly, I was sometj.mes aided in these arrangements by 
mission pe:::'sonnel, teachers, government ofi'icers, and others, including 
two paid interpreters in South Nasioi and Kongara. In few cases, when 
,no prior arrangements could be made or no introduc~ions obtained, 1 was 
forced to visit a village on -:ny o',m cut with my wife accompanying me. 
In these cases, as well as in the better arranged in"tervie,,;s, I asked 
to talk first ,dth the traditional lea"l.ers or "big men" (1 usee the 
indigenous term when known, e. g., rrru.;mi in Si wai or oboring in Nasioi). 
Then if there was time 1 tried to talk with other older men and women 
of the village. In interviewing women and eve~ in approaching a village 
as a stranger I believe it was advantageous to have had my wife with me. 
The women seemed very pleased to see her and on occasions she was able 
to take photographs of them when I was refused such a request. Some-
times taro gardens were visittod (especially in South Nasioi and Kongara), 
so that I could se.e firsthand how the oral explanations gathered were 
related to actual conditions in the garden. I was shown examples of 
most of the serious taro pests and diseases on these visits. 
In conducting the interviews, I tried to keep in mind the estab-
lished techniques and principles of good oral history interviewing. 
But because of certain practical considerations it was not always 
possible to adhere to all of the appropriate conventions. For exalnple, 
it wus not nlways possible tOllchieve opti:num intervieving conditions. 
Often a large group gathered u.nd it was difficult to politely inter'/iew 
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only a single person at a time. SometilCles younger "big headed" men 
tried to interrupt their elders in an attempt to gain attention by 
taking over and answering in English or a more understandable form of 
Pidgin. On other occasions during interviews. with women, men would walk 
up and try to take over. Other conventions were better observed. As 
mentioned, r always asked to see the "big man" of the village first and 
usually succeeded (many times there were several "big men"). I re-
frained from asking leading questions. Rather than initially mentioning 
a taro disease, I asked which food had been the most import~~t before 
the war, Which food was most important after the war, and why the change. 
r did not use a questionnaire nor any sort of scheduled format. I tried 
to encourage the informants to simply tell me the story of how they had 
lost taro as their staple food. Often however this approac:l brought 
only a limited response, causing me to ask specific questions. 
Usually the following questions were asked, but except for ques-
tions 1-3, not necessarily in the order shown (they were asked in Pidgin 
but the English equivalents are given here): 
1) What was the most important food during the time of the 
ancestors? Before the war? 
2) What was the most important food after the war? &~d now? 
3) Why is taro no longer the most important food? 
4) What happens when taro is planted? Does it grow? 
5) When did this taro sickness first break out, and does it have 
a name in the local language? 
6) Was it present before the war? I·las it known during the time of 
the ancestors? 
.. 
• 
7) Photos of taro plants ciispl3.y:Lng viru,~-like disease Syn:ptOiJS 
were often shown. Informants were asked if 3UC!1 sic~:l.esses ,,"ere 
familiar and how long they had been present. 
8) i-That are the names of the most serious taro diseases 
(sicknesses ~ ? What do they lock like and hm. long have they been 
present? 
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9) At present what is the most serious "taro disease? '.-men is the 
blight the most serious? During rain or sun? 
10) If the informant had said that ;vorld 'dar II bOrloing of spraying 
had spoiled tht:! ground for taro, he has asked why sweet potato ilad not 
been affe~t,ed, too. 
11) Are there remedies (medisen in Pidgin) for taro diseases? For 
which diseases? ifhat were these remedies and were they tried against 
the new sickness (the blight)? (This question was first asked only 
after an informant) in an early interview, volunteered that medisen(s) 
were used against certain taro diseases.) 
12) Have you or has anyone ever asked the DAS? for helping in 
growing taro? 
13) Are there medisen(s) for sweet potatoes? ~Thy not? 
14) If taro were again plentiful as it used to be, would you like 
to eat taro everyday? Would YOll continue to eat sweet potato, too? 
15) Are people in other areas still able to grow a. lot of. taro? 
Where do these people live and how are they able to do it? 
16) Has taro ever been brought in from other islands '? Did the 
Japanese bring any new taro? ~lat foods did the Japanese bring? 
J 
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The above is not a complete list of all ~uestions asked. Sometimes 
not all of the above questions were asked; many times questions not 
listed were asked. The questions varied according to the course of each 
interview. But the questions listed are quite representative of what 
was asked in a typical interview. 
Except in South Nasioi and Kongara where interpreters were 
employed, most of the interviews were conducted by me in Pidgin English. 
When I first arrived in Bougainville District, my Pidgin was very halting 
because I had had little practice after having gained some skill through 
the use of taped language lessons while still in Honolulu. But after 
about three weeks of intensive contact with Pidgin speakers, I was able 
to use the language with increasing facility. I found that most of 
those interviewed could speak and understand (even my) Pidgin quite 
easily. When older people were interviewed, sometimes a younger person 
more fluent in Pidgin, would act as an interpreter. When this happened 
I tried to make sure the interpreter told me exactly what was said 
rather than what he, himself, believed to be true. Since most of the 
older people were familiar with Pidgin they couJ.d correct the inter-
preter if he misrepresented what they had said. It is true that my 
Pidgin was never as good as that of the indigenous people or long-time 
European residents. A more experienced Pidgin speaker might have 
gathered more det~led and accurate information. However~ because of 
the rather specific nature of the questions asked and the widespread 
agreement among the responses of different informants, I believe that 
most of the information I gathered was reliable. 
As mentioned in the text, people in a given area (not surprisingly) 
tended to give the same responses and explanations as their i~mediate 
• 
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neighbors, so that nume!"ous loee..l intervie'.rs bec8.!!le rapidly redundant. 
Because my interviews were limited to only ten of the 23 2ensus districts 
on Bougainville-Buka, this redundancy undoubtedly reduced the amount of 
diverse information gathered. On the other ha..'1d, receiving the SaLle 
information from many informants helped to establish that it was true 
or at least widely believed to be true . 
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